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The Origins of Civil Rights in
America
G. Edward White†
Abstract
This Article makes three contributions. First, it represents the
first sustained effort to identify and trace the origins of the legal
category
of
civil
rights
in
American
constitutional
jurisprudence. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the category of civil
rights
did
not
extend
back
to
the
Declaration
of
Independence or to the framing of the Constitution. There was no
established category of “civil rights” in eighteenth- and early
nineteenth-century American law, although one can find discussion of
the “privileges and immunities” of citizens of the United States and
occasional mention of the term “civil rights.” The category only came
into being with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 18661 and
received its first judicial interpretations in the context of the
Reconstruction-era constitutional amendments. In the decades of the
1870s and 1880s, the category was refined, but there was never a clear
consensus about the content or scope of civil rights, or the extent to
which they could be enforced by the federal government.
Second, the Article follows the work of recent scholars, such as
William Nelson, Michael Collins, and most prominently Pamela
Brandwein, in seeking to revise a conventional narrative about the
constitutional history of the Reconstruction era. That narrative
asserts that Reconstruction began as a distinctly libertarian and
egalitarian vision, premised on the creation of new universal rights of
citizenship and enforcement of those rights by the federal
government. It then claims that in the years between 1866 and the
mid-1880s, that vision was derailed and the prospective rights of
former African American slaves in former Confederate states largely
abandoned. It assigns some responsibility for the abandonment of the
original goals of Reconstruction to the Supreme Court of the United
States in the tenures of Chief Justices Salmon Chase and Morrison
Waite, emphasizing Court majorities’ narrow readings of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities and Equal
Protection Clauses in the Slaughter-House Cases2 and invalidation of
†

David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law, University of
Virginia School of Law. My thanks to Michael Collins, Kurt Lash, and
George Rutherglen for their comments on earlier drafts of the article.

1.

Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (reenacted by Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114,
§ 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–1982
(2012)).

2.

83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
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the public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 18753
in the Civil Rights Cases.4
Finally, the Article has implications for a longstanding debate
about the “original understandings” of framers of the
Reconstruction Amendments, in particular whether the Fourteenth
Amendment was originally understood as “incorporating” some of the
provisions of the Bill of Rights against the states. The Article finds
that the Court’s Reconstruction-era civil rights jurisprudence was
primarily driven by a concern that too-broad readings of the power of
the federal government to enforce new civil rights would radically
disturb the existing balance of state and federal powers. That
concern, the Article suggests, emanated from an assumption on the
part of the justices that the Privileges and Immunities and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment were capable of
being read as robust definitions of the privileges and immunities of
national citizenship and of a right to equal treatment under the law,
both of which could be enforced by the federal courts. Precisely
because of this assumption, Chase and Waite Court majorities sought
to define the meaning of “privileges or immunities”5 and “equal
protection of the laws”6 narrowly.
The Article concludes by maintaining that a proper understanding
of the category of “civil rights” at its origin needs to take into
account the fact that both the conceptualization and interpretation of
the category were driven by established antebellum understandings
about “rights” and federalism. The result was that instead of initially
expansive definitions of new national civil rights being narrowed in
the 1870s and 1880s, the category remained fluid and uncertain.

3.

18 Stat. 335.

4.

109 U.S. 3 (1883).

5.

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2.

6.

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4.
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Introduction
We tend to think of “civil rights” as a ubiquitous category,
encompassing a variety of freedoms and entitlements associated with
being an American. We also tend to think of the heritage of civil
rights as extending back to the Declaration of Independence, the
framing of the Constitution, and the Magna Carta and ancient rights
of English subjects. But in fact, civil rights, as a legal category, was
imperfectly understood in the United States before the Civil War. It
was only after three decades of legislation, court decisions, and
commentary before the boundaries of the category were
established.
This Article reviews that process. Sections II and III recover the
dominant understandings about legal “rights” in antebellum American
jurisprudence and the possible effect of the Civil Rights Act of 18667
and the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments on those
7.

Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (reenacted by Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114,
§ 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–1982
(2012)).
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understandings. Those inquiries reveal that when the three
Amendments and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 were enacted between
1865 and 1870, there was no widespread consensus about the content
of “civil rights,” nor about which institutions of government were to
enforce those rights. The category of “civil rights,” by which was
meant rights that attached to all American citizens, was itself new:
“rights” had not been understood in so universal a fashion before the
Civil War. Thus the enactments collectively raised the possibility that
a spate of new rights, associated with state and United States
citizenship, had been created, and that the federal government could
enforce them against states.
That possibility served as background to three decades of judicial
decisions and legislative commentary in which the legal category of
“civil rights” was refined. Section IV of the Article, building on the
work of Pamela Brandwein and others, describes the manner in which
the category took shape. The category had two dimensions, one
connected to its content and the other to its implications for the
American system of federalism. Distinctions such as those between
“secured” and “created” rights, and between “civil” and “social”
rights, were designed to place types of conduct within or outside the
category. They also were designed to signal which sorts of rights could
be enforced against the states by the federal government and which
sorts remained in the province of the states.
With those distinctions and their federalism implications in place,
the Article reconsiders the leading Court decisions in the conventional
narrative of Reconstruction, the Slaughter-House Cases and the Civil
Rights Cases. That reconsideration engenders a narrative of the
constitutional history of the Reconstruction era that differs from the
one currently in place.
The narrative has three central features. First, in what has
become the conventional historiographical narrative of the
constitutional history of Reconstruction, the Reconstruction
Congresses have been described as treating the Union’s eradication of
slavery and opening up of “free” western territory as mandates for a
new egalitarian and libertarian vision of postbellum American society.
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court, under the tenure of Chief Justice
Morrison Waite, has been characterized as reluctant to embrace that
vision. The Waite Court’s agenda, according to the narrative, was
fostering reunion between the North and South at the expense of
newly freed African Americans, and the Court’s posture has been seen
as fatal to the promise of Reconstruction.8
8.

The most influential illustration of that narrative, Eric Foner’s
Reconstruction, called the Reconstruction era “America’s Unfinished
Revolution” and announced that one of the major themes of his account
was “the emergence during the Civil War and Reconstruction of a
national state possessing vastly expanded authority and a new set of

758

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 3·2014
The Origins of Civil Rights in America

Building on recent scholarship that identified problems with the
conventional narrative, this Article concludes that the narrative is
anachronistic and in need of refinement. The Court’s interpretations
of Reconstruction-era civil rights enactments were not incompatible
with the protection of the rights of African Americans in certain
contexts. But they rested on doctrinal distinctions that have become
obscured with time.9
purposes, including an unprecedented commitment to the ideal of a
national citizenship whose equal rights belonged to all Americans
regardless of race.” Both that ideal and the accompanying authority of
the federal government to enforce it were casualties, Foner maintained,
of the compromise of 1877, which “marked a decisive retreat from the
idea . . . of a powerful national state protecting the fundamental rights
of American citizens.” The ideals of Reconstruction were further
undermined, Foner argued, by the Supreme Court, which “during the
1870s . . . retreated from an expansive definition of federal power, and
moved a long way toward emasculating the postwar amendments,” and
in the 1880s “declared the Civil Rights Act of 1875 unconstitutional”
and used its “expanded jurisdiction born of Reconstruction” to “protect
corporations from local regulation” rather than protecting African
Americans from discrimination. Foner, Reconstruction, xxvi, 529,
582, 586–87 (1988). In a recent lecture at Marquette University Law
School, Foner reaffirmed this view, saying, “Reconstruction was a time
of remarkable experiment in democracy, but of course it was short-lived,
and there followed a long period where the rights protected by the
[Reconstruction-era] constitutional amendments were flagrantly violated
in the South and indeed much of the rest of the nation. One part of this
long process of retreat from the egalitarian impulse of Reconstruction
was a sharp narrowing of the rights that came along with being an
American citizen. In this, the Supreme Court led the way.” Eric Foner,
The Civil War, Reconstruction, and the Origins of Birthright
Citizenship, Marquette Lawyer, Summer 2013 at 41–42 [hereinafter
Foner, The Civil War].
9.

Work by legal scholars contemporaneous with and following Foner’s
book advanced readings of Supreme Court and lower federal court
decisions that suggested that Foner’s characterization of the response of
the federal judiciary to Reconstruction Amendments and legislation was
oversimplified. See, e.g., Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Politics of
Judicial Interpretation 1–6 (1985); William E. Nelson, The
Fourteenth Amendment: From Political Principle to Judicial
Decision 194–96 (1988); Michael G. Collins, Justice Bradley’s Civil
Rights Odyssey Revisited, 70 Tul. L. Rev. 1979 (1996). More recently
Pamela Brandwein has set forth a major reinterpretation of what she
calls the “judicial settlement of Reconstruction,” emphasizing, among
other things, the anachronistic assumptions of the conventional
narrative. See Pamela Brandwein, A Judicial Abandonment of Blacks?
Rethinking the “State Action” Cases of the Waite Court, 41 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 343, 380 (2007); Pamela Brandwein, Rethinking the
Judicial Settlement of Reconstruction (2011) [hereinafter
Brandwein, Rethinking Reconstruction]. My subsequent narrative
of the Reconstruction-era history of the category of civil rights should be
understood as informed, in some places, by that work, and in other
places addressing issues outside its scope. Instances in which I have
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After the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,10 judicial
decisions in the 1870s and 1880s distinguished between two different
classes of rights, so-called “secured” or “natural” rights and so-called
“created” or “conferred” rights.11 The former class included rights that
in antebellum jurisprudence were thought to be among the “privileges
and immunities” of state citizens. Those rights were creatures of state
law, meaning they could be restricted by states and were reserved
only for citizens, which did not include all residents of states. The
latter class consisted of rights that had been granted to citizens by
provisions of the Constitution.12 Brandwein’s analysis of Supreme
Court and lower federal court decisions in voting rights cases has
shown that the most conspicuous example of that class was the right
afforded to black as well as white people, who were citizens of both
the states and the United States after the passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment, not to have their opportunities to vote restricted on the
basis of race.
The federalism implications of those two classes of civil rights
were different. With respect to the first class, the federal government
could not intervene to protect “secured” rights under its Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement powers unless a state had intentionally or
negligently failed to safeguard them. This meant that in many cases
individual infringements of civil rights in the states remained
unprotected. With respect to “created” or “conferred” rights, however,
the enforcement powers of the federal government were available to
protect against civil rights violations, whether by states or
individuals.13
Because some provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment appeared
to be conferring new rights on citizens or persons, it was necessary for
courts to consider whether rights contained in the Privileges or
Immunities, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses were
relied directly on the findings or interpretations of other scholars are
identified in the notes that follow.
10.

14 Stat. 27.

11.

See, e.g., The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 96 (1873)
(Field, J., dissenting) (questioning whether the Privileges and
Immunities Clause “refers to the natural and inalienable rights which
belong to all citizens,” as opposed to new privileges “confer[red]” upon
citizens by the Amendment).

12.

Both Collins, supra note 9, at 1990–98, and Brandwein, Rethinking
Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 11–17 (recognizing that the
distinction between “secured” and “created or conferred” rights was
crucial to Justice Joseph Bradley and his contemporaries, although
Collins uses different language to describe the distinction).

13.

Both Collins, supra note 9, at 1993–95, and Brandwein, Rethinking
Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 11–14, recognize the federalism
implications of the distinction between “secured” and “conferred” rights.

760

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 3·2014
The Origins of Civil Rights in America

understood as being enforced against the states by the federal
government. Over a course of decisions that included both the
Slaughter-House Cases14 and the Civil Rights Cases,15 the Supreme
Court answered that question in the affirmative but at the same time
read the rights conferred by those provisions narrowly.16 Thus, on the
whole, the antebellum balance between state and federal powers was
retained after the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments. The
Court primarily anticipated federal supervision of state or private
activity in the area of voting rights. That approach, however, was not
a judicial “retreat” from the anticipated goals of Reconstruction;17 it
reflected mainstream late nineteenth-century understandings of the
category of “civil rights” and of the interactions between the states
and the federal government. Both the Slaughter-House Cases and the
Civil Rights Cases need to be situated within those understandings,
rather than being seen primarily as cases in which Court majorities
rejected broad interpretations of the civil rights of American citizens.
Finally, the article has implications for a debate about the
“original understandings” of the framers of the Reconstruction
Amendments. It suggests that the Court’s “narrow” interpretations of
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities and Equal
Protection Clauses in the Slaughter-House Cases and the Civil Rights
Cases were driven by an assumption that the Amendment could be
read as anticipating a robust definition of the privileges or immunities
of national citizenship, and of a right to equal treatment before the
law that extended to all persons, both of which could be enforced by
the federal courts. It was precisely because of this assumption that the
Court advanced minimalist interpretations of both the Privileges or
Immunities and Equal Protection Clauses. Broader interpretations,
Supreme Court majorities feared, would radically upset the balance
between state and federal powers that they had inherited from
antebellum jurisprudence.
This Article thus seeks to dislodge two established propositions
about nineteenth-century constitutional history and to intervene in a
longstanding interpretative debate. It attempts to undermine the

14.

83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).

15.

109 U.S. 3 (1883).

16.

See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 75 (1873)
(holding that the Privileges and Immunities Clause did not alter the
police powers of the state, but instead affected only the rights of citizens
of the United States, as opposed to citizens of the particular state); The
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (holding that the Equal
Protection Clause did not affect the private choices of individuals to
exclude black persons from business establishments).

17.

See Foner, The Civil War, supra note 8, at 41 (referring to those Court
opinions as a “retreat” and a judicial “narrowing of . . . rights”).
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assumption that there was a received understanding of the category of
“civil rights,” which formed a background to the passage of the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, and the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. There was no such understanding; “civil rights”
was a novel and fluid category, spending the last quarter of the
nineteenth century in a process of evolution.
In aligning itself with and elaborating upon the revisionist work of
other scholars, the article also seeks to modify the conventional view
that the Supreme Court, in the 1870s and 1880s, fashioned interpretations of Reconstruction-era amendments and legislation which
were designed to narrow the scope of judicially protected civil rights
in order to undermine the libertarian and egalitarian goals of
Reconstruction. The Court did fashion narrow interpretations in some
cases, but not in all cases. While seeking to preserve antebellum
models of federalism, it acknowledged that in some instances
Reconstruction-era Amendments had conferred new civil rights on all
American citizens, and the federal judiciary was required to protect
those rights against efforts to curtail them by states or private
individuals.
Finally, the article suggests that the focus of twentieth- and
twenty-first-century scholars on whether the Fourteenth Amendment
“incorporates” provisions of the Bill of Rights against the states has
rested on an anachronistic reading of the Amendment. That reading is
understandable, since the Court itself has used the language of
incorporation in treating some Bill of Rights provisions as part of the
“due process” requirements imposed on states by the Amendment.18
But it departs from the way in which contemporaries viewed the
Reconstruction Amendments and the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
Although contemporaries of those enactments differed on the
content of their central provisions, they viewed them holistically, as
charters for the new rights and privileges of citizens of the United
States that were potentially to be enforced against the states by the
18.

An abiding difficulty, in seeking to recover the original understanding of
the framers of constitutional provisions, is separating the language of
those provisions from subsequent judicial interpretations of them. When
one examines the comments of contemporaries at the time of the
framing of the Fourteenth Amendment, one is unable to find any
mention of Bill of Rights provisions being “incorporated” against the
states by that Amendment’s passage. Nonetheless, as we will see in more
detail, some Reconstruction-era members of Congress, and judges,
assumed that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities
Clause was designed to create a new set of national civil rights, which
included not only rights mentioned in the Bill of Rights but also
traditional civil rights that had been hitherto thought as being directed
only at states. The idea of rights held against the federal government as
being “incorporated” against the states by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment did not surface until Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
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federal government. Since both the idea that all citizens of states were
now also citizens of the United States, and the corresponding idea
that citizens of the United States had “privileges or immunities” and
“libert[ies]” that states were now constitutionally bound to recognize,
were departures from antebellum constitutional jurisprudence, the
critical question for contemporary interpreters of the Reconstructionera enactments was how much they would disturb the existing
balance of federal and state powers. That question turned on what
new national “civil rights,” which states were now bound to protect,
were contained in the enactments.
This Article’s focus is on the evolution of judicial doctrine, not on
the social or political context of the Waite Court’s decisions. It
therefore does not overlap with some of the emphasis of the
conventional historiography of Reconstruction, insofar as that
emphasis is drawn from analyses of late nineteenth-century political,
social, and economic developments. But the article does confront an
image of the Chase and Waite Courts that appears in that literature.
One might ask where that image comes from, especially since it does
not rest on any detailed analysis of those Courts’ work.
The image is a product of an interpretation of the work of judges
advanced by many historians and political scientists. That
interpretation is grounded on the outcomes reached by influential
judges, such as Supreme Court justices, in visible cases, such as those
that involve interpretations of the Constitution. Those outcomes are
treated as political statements comparable to the legislative decisions
of Congress or Presidential orders. The outcomes are given political
labels, such as “liberal” or “conservative,” and sometimes partisan
labels as well, such as “Republican” or “Democratic.” The analysis
presupposes that judges are self-conscious political actors who often
have partisan agendas, and the outcomes they reach in cases reflect
those agendas. Part of the conclusion that the Court helped
“abandon” the libertarian and egalitarian goals of Reconstruction
flows from the assumption that the Court’s justices, as post–Civil
War political actors, were unsympathetic to those goals.19
This Article assumes that conceiving of judicial decisions as
political statements, and interpreting them in terms of their
outcomes, results in an incomplete understanding of the nature of
19.

Brandwein, Rethinking Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 25–26,
states the following: “During the Progressive and New Deal eras . . .
materialist histories of post–Civil War America were written which cast
the postwar Court as the tool of big business. . . . In general, these
materialist histories projected the political and economic developments
of the 1890s backward onto the postwar years.” While I do not disagree
with that comment, my explanation for the anachronistic character of
the conventional narrative emphasizes perceptions about the nature of
law and judging.
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judicial decision making. In the view of this Article, the primary task
of judges is the interpretation of purportedly authoritative legal
sources, and those interpretations are primarily constrained not by
the political context of judicial decisions but by the received doctrinal
frameworks in which those decisions are set. Those doctrinal
frameworks invariably bring with them existing legal categories and
interpretive “understandings,” which are necessarily the product of
previous generations. Those preexisting doctrinal frameworks, and the
understandings that help drive them, significantly constrain judicial
decision making by limiting the scope of “authoritative” legal
justifications on which judges can ground their decisions.
When the enactment of new authoritative legal sources, such as
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 or the Reconstruction-era constitutional
amendments, requires judges to interpret those sources, pressure is
implicitly placed on the interpreters to integrate the sources into
existing doctrinal frameworks. Sometimes terminology employed in
the new sources is sufficiently open-ended as to invite judges to
supply it with content in the course of their interpretations; the
Privileges or Immunities, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment provide illustrations. It is in the
process of seeking determinate meaning for open-ended terms that
received doctrinal frameworks and understandings come into play.
When justices confronted cases that required them to give content
to the “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,” or
“liberties” within the Due Process Clause, or the “Equal Protection of
the Laws,” they did so with an awareness of what those terms had
meant in antebellum jurisprudence, as well as an awareness of the
relationship between the powers of the states and those of the federal
government in the antebellum decades. They recognized that they
were being asked to determine how far antebellum doctrines and
understandings had been displaced by new Reconstruction-era
authoritative sources.
If one assumes that justices approached the interpretation of the
new sources with that posture, it should be no surprise that two
concerns should have animated their interpretations. One concern was
whether the scope of the new “privileges” or “immunities” or
“liberties” conferred on individuals by the Reconstruction-era
enactments was intended to extend beyond the area of race relations.
The other was whether any new “civil rights” conferred on individuals
by the Civil Rights Act of 1866, or any of the Reconstruction
amendments, were to be enforced against states by the federal
government, thereby potentially transforming the laws of the states.
In addressing those concerns across a range of cases between the early
1870s and the mid-1880s, Court majorities concluded that the new
authoritative sources were not designed to have a fully transformative
effect. Their impact was to be limited to violations of “civil rights”
with a racial animus, and their effect on traditional understandings of
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the relationship between federal and state powers was to be negligible.
The method by which the justices reached those conclusions was to
fashion new doctrinal distinctions within the traditional framework of
antebellum constitutional jurisprudence. Thus, to understand the
constitutional history of Reconstruction, it will be necessary to start
with antebellum conceptions and understandings of “civil rights” and
of federalism.

I. The Antebellum Legacy of “Rights”
A. Corfield v. Coryell

In 1823 Supreme Court Justice Bushrod Washington, in his
capacity as a circuit judge for the third federal circuit, decided the
case Corfield v. Coryell.20 The plaintiff in Corfield was a citizen of
Pennsylvania whose ship was used to harvest oysters in the state of
New Jersey. A New Jersey statute forbade non-residents from taking
shellfish from state waters. It was under this statute that Corfield’s
vessel was seized, condemned, and sold. He sued in federal court for
trespass, arguing, among other things, that the New Jersey statute
was in violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV,
Section 2 of the Constitution, which states that “the citizens of each
state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of the
citizens of the several states.”
Washington responded to this argument by attempting to
ascertain “the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
states.”21 He began that task by asserting that the terms would be
“confin[ed] . . . to those privileges and immunities which are in their
nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free
governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the
citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from the time
of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign.”22
By characterizing privileges and immunities as “fundamental,”
Washington was seeking to identify the privileges and immunities
that citizens brought with them, so to speak, when they became
members of free, republican governments. The privileges appeared to
be a species of “natural rights,” held, against the powers of the state,
by those who agreed to participate in the formation of republics. Since
the United States had been a republic since its creation, the privileges
and immunities of all its citizens had been “enjoyed” by them “at all
times . . . from the time of [the American states] becoming free,
independent, and sovereign.”23
20.

6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).

21.

Id. at 551.

22.

Id.

23.

Id.
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Because the privileges and immunities of citizens of all the
American states were “in their nature, fundamental,” Washington did
not think it would be “difficult,” though perhaps “tedious,” to identify
them.24 He gave a list, adding that there were “many others which
might be mentioned.”25 The list included
[T]he enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire
and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain
happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as
the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the
whole. The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to
reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture,
professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the
writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any
kind in the courts of the state; to take, hold and dispose of
property, either real or personal; and an exemption from higher
taxes and impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the
state . . . .26

To those Washington added “the elective franchise,” which he
acknowledged could be “regulated and established by the laws or
constitution of the state in which it is to be exercised.”27 He also
suggested that the Privileges and Immunities Clause “was manifestly
calculated,” in the words of the preamble of the Articles of
Confederation, to “secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and
intercourse among the people of the different states of the Union.”28
One commentator has concluded that determining “[w]hich rights
met [the] threshold” of being “fundamental” was “more obscured than
clarified” by Washington’s analysis,29 and two others have suggested
that “judicial interpretation of the [Privileges and Immunities Clause]
got off to a bad start” with Corfield.30 But if one takes Washington’s
effort to catalog “fundamental” privileges and immunities as a
snapshot of early nineteenth-century jurisprudential thinking about
the nature and sources of foundational legal rights, it has some
illuminating features.
24.

Id.

25.

Id. at 552.

26.

Id. at 551–52.

27.

Id. at 552.

28.

Id. (internal quotations marks omitted).

29.

George Rutherglen,
Slavery 25 (2013).

30.

Brainerd
Currie
&
Herma
Hill
Kay,
Unconstitutional
Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws; Privileges and Immunities, in
Brainerd Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws
460–61 (1963).

Civil
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First, it is clear from Washington’s analysis that most of the
“fundamental” privileges and immunities he cataloged did not
originate in the text of the Constitution. He described them as
“hav[ing], at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several
states which compose this Union, from the time of their being free,
independent, and sovereign.”31 That “time” began with the issuance of
the Declaration of Independence, eleven years before the Constitution
was drafted. Moreover, only one of the privileges Washington listed
was embodied in a provision of the Constitution, that of the writ of
habeas corpus. The others—enjoying life, liberty, happiness, and
safety, acquiring, possessing, and disposing of property, bringing legal
actions in the courts of a state, residing in or traveling through a
state, and being free from the burdens of unequal taxation—appear to
be something like the “inalienable rights” referred to in the
Declaration of Independence, privileges and immunities inherent in
the status of being a citizen of a free republican government.
Second, Washington’s analysis suggested that the purpose of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause was to “secure and perpetuate
mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different
states of the Union.”32 The clause appears in the same article of the
Constitution that contains the Full Faith and Credit Clause,33
requiring states to enforce the legal judgments of other states;34 a
clause compelling states to “deliver up” persons charged35 with
treason, felony, or other crimes to the states where they had been
charged; and the Fugitive Slave Clause,36 which provided that when
slaves escaped into other states they were to be returned by the
authorities of those states to their masters.37 In this context, the
Privileges and Immunities Clause appears to have been an effort to
prevent states from provoking other states by interfering with the
policies of those states or the exercise of certain classes of rights held
by nonresident citizens.
Finally, Washington’s analysis in Corfield suggested that the
category of “fundamental” privileges and immunities was a limited
one. It did not extend, for example, to the free enjoyment of the
fishing beds of a state by noncitizens. States could conclude, as part
of their power to promote “the general good” of their residents, that
the supply of fish within their boundaries might be exhausted if
31.

Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551.

32.

Id. at 552 (internal quotation marks omitted).

33.

U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.

34.

Id.

35.

Id. at art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.

36.

Id. at art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.

37.

Id.
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nonresidents were given unlimited access to state waters.38 Even
though the right to harvest oysters might seem to be an example of
the right to acquire property that Washington had identified as
“fundamental,” it could be limited to in-state residents. This
suggested that the Privileges and Immunities Clause was not going to
cut very deeply into the power of states to treat their residents more
favorably than nonresidents.
Washington’s opinion in Corfield cited no authorities in support
of his categorization of some privileges and immunities as
fundamental, but we have seen that his most likely basis for including
the privileges he singled out was an intuitive sense that they
represented inalienable rights that citizens of free republican
governments possessed. Thus, one could use Corfield as an illustration
of what Washington and his contemporaries believed were the
“natural rights” of early nineteenth-century Americans. There was,
however, another feature of Washington’s language in Corfield, and of
the Privileges and Immunities Clause itself: the “privileges and
immunities” protected were reserved for citizens. The clause referred
to the “Citizens of each State,” and to “Citizens in the several
States.”39
Other legal categories for describing persons existed in early
nineteenth-century American jurisprudence. The category of “alien”
described persons who were not citizens because they owed allegiance
to foreign powers. The category of “denizen” was less precise: it
referred to noncitizen residents of a particular area who might or
might not be aliens. An example was “Indians not taxed,” a category
mentioned in Article I of the Constitution. That category captured
the ambiguous status of Native American tribes at the time of the
Constitution’s framing. It was assumed that some tribal members
owed allegiance to their tribes rather than the United States, but
tribes were not regarded as “foreign nations,” so tribal members could
not be aliens.40 On the other hand, only those tribal members who
had become fully integrated into settler communities were considered
“citizens,” and some of those members voted, held property, and paid
taxes. Hence the term “Indians not taxed” referred to members of
tribes who were not considered citizens.41
The categories described above revealed that a number of
residents of the United States in the early nineteenth century were
not regarded as citizens and that the inalienable privileges

38.

Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 552–54.

39.

U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.

40.

Rogers M. Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History 144–45 (1997).

41.

Smith, supra note 40 at 144–45.
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Washington listed in Corfield were reserved for persons with
citizenship status. The conferral of “citizenship” of this sort was
understood as being within the province of states from independence
through the Civil War, and it was clear that numerous residents of
America, the most conspicuous being the majority of African
Americans and Native Americans, were not treated as citizens.42
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, citizenship
status was not explicitly conferred by statute. Instead, citizenship was
implicitly conferred by laws and practices limiting the number of
persons who could exercise Washington’s list of privileges.43 In most
states only white male freeholders could vote. In many, married
women could not own property independent of their husbands. Slaves
were not permitted to own or acquire property, to travel freely, or to
vote, and their ability to bring actions in court was limited. Native
Americans were rarely permitted to vote. Only a handful of states
permitted free blacks to vote, and in Southern states they were not
permitted to travel freely.44
B. Luther v. Borden

In addition to governing the decision in Corfield, antebellum
understandings of the nature and scope of “rights” can be seen in an
argument before the Supreme Court in the 1849 case Luther v.
Borden,45 in which the Court concluded that it could not decide,
under the Guarantee Clause of the Constitution,46 a controversy about

42.

For an extended discussion of the limitations on the definition of citizen
in the first three decades of the nineteenth century, including free
African Americans, Native Americans, and women, see id. at 165–96.
Citizenship in the sense of being regarded as a person who possessed
inalienable privileges and immunities was distinguishable from
naturalized citizenship. The latter term was reserved for former aliens
who chose to transfer their allegiance to the United States. The framers
of the Constitution, mindful of the quite different standards states had
applied in considering whether to naturalize aliens, reserved the power
“to establish a uniform rule of naturalization” in Congress. U.S. Const.
art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Thus it was possible for a person to be a naturalized
citizen of the United States but not a full “citizen” of a state in the
sense of being able to exercise all the privileges associated with
citizenship.

43.

See Gardner v. Ward, 2 Mass. (2 Will.) 244, 244 (1805) (stating that
the determination of “what were the rights of Mr. G., or in what state
he must be considered in law” would not be “affected by any . . .
legislative act . . . [but rather] by the principles of the common
law. . . .”).

44.

For more detail, see Rutherglen, supra note 29, at 21–23.

45.

48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).

46.

U.S. Const. art IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall
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which of two competing governments was the legitimate government
of Rhode Island.47
One argument invoked by supporters of the displaced government
maintained that “every male inhabitant over twenty-one years of age”
in Rhode Island “[had] a natural right to vote.”48 In response, John
Whipple, representing the defendant in the case, took the occasion to
review “classes of rights” in American jurisprudence. Whipple
identified three classes: “natural, such as those recognized in the
Declaration of Independence; civil, such as the rights of property; and
political rights.”49 He then went on to say that
Society has nothing to do with natural rights except to protect
them. . . . Every one has the right to acquire property, and even
in infants the laws of all governments preserve this. But
political rights are matters of practical utility. A right to vote
comes under this class. If it was a natural right, it would
appertain to every human being, females and minors. . . . But
. . . the State has the power to affix any limit . . . to the
enjoyment of this right . . . . It can confine the right of voting
to freeholders . . .50

Whipple did not clearly distinguish between “natural” and “civil”
rights, although his understanding of the latter category appeared to
be similar to that of Washington in Corfield. But he obviously
regarded “political” rights as those conferred by government rather
than inherent in citizenship. Under this interpretation, the Fourteenth
Amendment’s broadening of the category of citizens to include “all
persons” meant that a larger number of residents of a state would
possess “civil rights,” but the state could still place restrictions on the
right to vote. At the close of the Civil War, most states continued to
limit the franchise to male freeholders.
Thus by the time that the 39th Congress, controlled by
representatives from the Union states, considered drafting the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Civil Rights Act of
1866, there was no consensus on what the “civil rights” of Americans
were, or to whom those rights extended.51 The legacy of the late
protect them against Invasion, and on Application of the Legislature . . .
against domestic violence.”).
47.

Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 1.

48.

Id. at 28.

49.

Id.

50.

Id. at 28–29.

51.

Rutherglen, supra note 29, at 53–54, notes that the 1856 edition of
Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, at the time a standard source for the
definition of legal terms, had no entry for “civil rights.” Editions
published after 1866 added an entry that defined “civil rights” as
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eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, while affirming the
theoretical proposition that citizens of free republican governments
enjoyed some inalienable privileges and immunities, had mainly been
a restrictive one, emphasizing the extent to which states could limit
the exercise of those privileges.

II. The Thirty-Ninth Congress and “Civil Rights”
The question that galvanized the 39th Congress into action
on the issue of “civil rights” was the prospective eradication of
African American slavery and what had come to be called its “badges
and incidents.”52 The Supreme Court’s 1857 decision in Dred
Scott53 had concluded that Congress had no power to abolish
slavery in federal territories and that African Americans were not
“citizens” for the purpose of being able to bring actions in the federal
courts.54 If there had been any ambiguity about the connection
between citizenship status and the exercise of fundamental
privileges and immunities after Corfield, Dred Scott resolved it:
African Americans did not have the right to sue in the federal
courts because they were not citizens.
A. The Thirteenth Amendment

There were thus two potential issues in Dred Scott in which the
39th Congress could intervene. One was the status of slavery in the
United States; the other was the citizenship status of African
Americans after emancipation. The Thirteenth Amendment explicitly
addressed the former of those issues and implicitly addressed the
latter. The Amendment’s first section declared that “[n]either slavery
nor involuntary servitude shall exist within the United States, or any
place subject to their jurisdiction.”55 This meant that slavery was
abolished in all states and remaining federal territories and that its
abolition reached private action. The language of the section was
modeled on Article VI of the Northwest Ordinance, which abolished
slavery in that territory and had been understood to apply to the
conduct of private parties.
“certain rights secured to citizens of the United States by the 13th and
14th amendments to the constitution, and by various acts of congress
made in pursuance thereof.”
52.

The first use of that term came in debates over the Civil Rights
Act of 1866. See Rutherglen, supra note 29, at 66–67. It is not clear
exactly what members of the 39th Congress meant by “badges and
incidents” of slavery.

53.

Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).

54.

Id. at 427.

55.

U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1.
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The second section of the Thirteenth Amendment stated,
“Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.”56 Since no legislation was needed to emancipate former
slaves after the Amendment’s passage, that section was designed to
allow Congress to prescribe rules for the treatment of emancipated
African Americans, including the potential categorization of them as
citizens of states or of the United States. It was this feature of the
Amendment that caused its opponents to claim that it amounted to a
radical disruption of the existing balance between state and federal
power. They were concerned that enforcement legislation directed at
the status of free blacks in states with large African American
populations would constitute a usurpation by the federal government
of the traditional powers of states to pass laws affecting the lives of
their residents.57
B. The Civil Rights Act of 1866

When the text of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 is unraveled, it
becomes clear that the drafters of that legislation intended to do
exactly what opponents of the Thirteenth Amendment had feared: use
the enforcement powers of Congress to alter the treatment of
emancipated African Americans in former slave states. Section 1 of
the Act provided:
That all persons born in the United States and not subject to
any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby
declared to be citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of
every race and color, without regard to any previous condition
of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall
have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United
States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and
give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey
real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as
is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom to the contrary
notwithstanding.58

Of particular interest are two dimensions of the Act’s coverage: the
“civil rights” it enumerated, especially when compared with
Washington’s list of the privileges and immunities of citizenship in
Corfield; and its governing theory of the relationship of federal and
56.

U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 2.

57.

Rutherglen, supra note 29, at 38.

58.

Civil Rights Act of 1866, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
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state institutions in enforcing the Act’s provisions. The passage of the
Act left both of those dimensions in an unsettled state.
The Act employed the familiar antebellum categories for
describing persons. It identified the possession of civil rights with the
status of citizenship and defined citizens as all persons, regardless of
race and color, who were born in the United States and not aliens
(those “subject to any foreign power”) or “Indians not taxed.” Its
understanding of who was a citizen was thus the antebellum
understanding, with one conspicuous difference: all nonwhite, nativeborn Americans (save “Indians not taxed”) were given citizenship
status. This meant that any state law or practice explicitly or
implicitly denying citizenship to free blacks was contrary to
the Act.
In keeping with antebellum understandings, the civil rights listed
in the Act were accorded to citizens. Those rights were facially
narrower than the privileges and immunities listed by Washington in
Corfield. They included making and enforcing contracts, bringing
actions in court, holding, acquiring, and conveying property. As in
Corfield, citizens were entitled to the benefit of laws protecting the
security of person and property and were governed by laws subjecting
them to civil and criminal penalties and punishments. They did not
include voting rights, rights to travel and to reside within a state,
rights to equal taxes, or rights to acquire and to pursue happiness.
They also modified Washington’s understanding of civil rights in
Corfield in one important respect. At the time of Corfield, black
residents of many states were not afforded the rights catalogued in
the Act and were subjected to civil and criminal penalties that
differed from those imposed on white residents. The Act explicitly
changed that treatment. Black citizens, under the Act, were deemed
“to have the same right[s]” as were “enjoyed by white citizens” in
“every State and Territory in the United States.” This was so even if
“any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom” was “to the
contrary.” The obvious referents of this language were the “Black
Codes” drafted by several Southern states late in 1865, as the ThirtyNinth Congress came into session.59
Some of the black codes, notably those of South Carolina and
Mississippi, recited rights purportedly enjoyed by black as well as
white persons, such as holding and acquiring property, suing and
being sued, and having the protection of civil and criminal laws. The
codes then inserted provisions stating that those declarations of rights
were to be modified by subsequent provisions, which discriminated
against free blacks in numerous respects. The declarations of “civil
rights” in the codes were used as models by the drafters of the Civil
59.

For illustrations of Black Codes, see Theodore Brantner Wilson,
The Black Codes of the South 61–80 (1965).
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Rights Act, who then made it clear that the Act overrode any black
codes to the contrary.60
The Act assumed that the principal mechanism for enforcing its
provisions would be the federal courts,61 although sections of the Act
alluded to enforcement by the military or federal marshals.62 There
was considerable debate in Congress about what judicial enforcement
of the Act might mean, with some opponents believing that the
declaration of rights derived from natural law or the common law
would give the federal courts license to work out the contours of those
rights, thereby transforming state law.63 But in the end, the Act’s
emphasis on the equal treatment of black and white citizens with
respect to the civil rights inherent in citizenship appeased opponents.
As one supporter of the Act put it, “[t]he bill does not declare who
shall or shall not have the right to sue, give evidence, inherit,
purchase, and sell property. These questions are left to the States to
determine . . . .”64
There was, however, an issue of federalism that lingered over the
passage of the Act: what was the basis for its citizenship clause? The
Act had extended national citizenship to “all persons in the United
States,” excepting aliens and “Indians not taxed” and had then
provided that all such persons had to be afforded the same rights as
were enjoyed by white persons. It was not clear where Congress’s
power to accomplish those goals had originated.
One possible basis was the Naturalization Clause. Congress could
unquestionably have passed legislation making all slaves citizens of
the United States under this clause. That would have effectively
ended their slave status, since slavery was incompatible with the
privileges and immunities of national citizenship identified in Corfield.
But Congress had passed the Thirteenth Amendment instead,

60.

For more detail, see Rutherglen, supra note 29, at 47–48. The last
portion of the Act’s last sentence, “any law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding,” would
have been taken as a reference to Black Codes. Although its
language sweeps more broadly, facially overriding “any law” or
“custom” inconsistent with the Act, such “notwithstanding”
clauses were conventionally employed as boilerplate in the
early nineteenth century. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1805, ch. 41,
§ 8, 2 Stat. 339, 342; Act of June 17, 1844, ch. 98, 5 Stat. 677;
Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 201, § 13, 12 Stat. 597, 599.

61.

For a deeper explanation, see Rutherglen, supra note 29, at 79.

62.

See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, §§ 5, 9, 14 Stat. 27. For more
detail, see Rutherglen, supra note 29, at 57.

63.

See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 478 (1866).

64.

Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1832 (1866) (Statement of Rep.
William Lawrence of Ohio).
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indicating that its primary goal was to abolish slavery, leaving the
question of slave citizenship to “appropriate legislation.”
Another potential basis for the Act was that after the Thirteenth
Amendment, the power was simply declaratory of existing law.65 But,
the form of the Thirteenth Amendment also undermined this
rationale. Had that power self-evidently followed from the passage of
the Thirteenth Amendment itself, Section 2 of the Amendment would
not have been necessary. No language in the Amendment, however,
addressed the equal treatment of persons, and no language addressed
citizenship. Moreover, a large number of persons residing in the
United States were not citizens under common law.
So the question remained whether Section 1 of the Civil Rights
Act, increasing the category of persons who were citizens of the
United States and providing them equal treatment on the basis of
race, was “appropriate” legislation. In this context, the Fourteenth
Amendment seemed to have been designed to remove any uncertainty
about the constitutional basis of the Act.66
C.

The Fourteenth Amendment

The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment decided to further
broaden the category of national citizenship and to further limit the
states’ power to restrict the rights of citizens. First, they extended the
category of national citizens to “[a]ll persons, born or naturalized in
the United States,”67 thereby including all Native Americans in the
category. Next, they equated state citizenship with national
citizenship, requiring states to treat Native Americans as citizens as
well. Then they added two additional limitations on the power of
states to restrict the rights of individuals. No state could “make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States,” and no state could “deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”68
The last two clauses, by using the language “any person,” widened
the restrictions on the conduct of states to include their treatment of
aliens (and subsequently corporations). It was inevitable, given the
potentially radical inroads into state sovereignty made by the
language of the Fourteenth Amendment, that the courts would need
to supply some meaning to terms such as “privileges or immunities”
65.

Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois made this argument in the debates
over the Act. See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475, 500, 600
(1866).

66.

For more detail, see Rutherglen, supra note 29, at 59–71, and
Brandwein, Rethinking Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 162.

67.

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

68.

Id.
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of national citizenship, “due process of law,” and “equal protection of
the laws,” and judicial interpretations of those terms became common
after 1870 and have played a major part in the conventional historical
narrative of Reconstruction.
D.

The Fifteenth Amendment

The Fifteenth Amendment, passed in 1870, would also play a role
in the Court’s creation of rules of civil rights enforcement. The
Fifteenth Amendment had a distinctive phraseology, revealing how
antebellum understandings of “rights” remained extant during the
Reconstruction years. The Amendment’s first section provided that
“[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied
or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude.” That language did not
mean that all American citizens were enfranchised. It meant that
race, color, or previous enslavement could not be made the basis for
denying voting privileges. The obvious import of the provision was to
strike at official efforts to prevent African Americans from voting.
What explains the peculiar wording of the section? Its language
did not prevent states or the federal government from restricting the
franchise, so long as restrictions were not based on race, color, or a
previous condition of servitude. Nor did it, on its face, prevent private
individuals from interfering with the exercise of voting rights. Instead,
it created a new right that in the antebellum vocabulary would be
designed a “political right”: the right not to have one’s capacity to
vote curtailed on the basis of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.69 What were the implications, for the enforcement of civil
rights by federal authorities, of the Amendment’s phraseology? Were
there to be different enforcement rules for different violations? And
what was the connection between enforcement rules and the class of
right being violated?
E.

Modifications of the Antebellum Legacy

Two inquiries are central to an examination of the cumulative
impact of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments,
and of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 on the status of antebellum
understandings of “rights.” One inquiry is whether the “rights”
successively protected by the 39th Congress’s enactments were
69.

As we have seen, a distinction between “civil” and “political” rights had
existed in antebellum jurisprudence, political rights being thought of as
those conferred or created by some positive enactment, such as a
constitutional amendment, and civil rights being associated with
“natural” rights. But once a political right had been created,
Reconstruction-era judges thought it capable of evolving into the status
of a “civil” right. See Brandwein, Rethinking Reconstruction,
supra note 9, at 163 (discussing voting rights).
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intended to be applied against the conduct of private parties as well
as state actors. The other is each enactment’s anticipated role for the
states and the federal government in securing those rights.
1. Parties

The language of the Thirteenth Amendment suggested that its
coverage was not limited to state action. Slavery and involuntary
servitude was abolished throughout the United States by the federal
government, and there was no language in Section 1 of the
Amendment restricting the scope of that abolition.
Section 2 of the Amendment gave Congress the power to enforce
the Amendment by “appropriate” legislation, and the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 was intended to be an example of that legislation. Its
language defining national citizenship, listing rights associated with it,
and declaring that all persons holding national citizenship “shall have
the same right[s]” as white citizens was directed at states, but also at
federal territories, and at customs as well as laws.70 One can therefore
assume that its limitations on the restriction of the rights of national
citizens applied to private as well as state conduct.
But the scope of protection afforded to “civil rights” by the
Thirteenth Amendment and the Act was not as broad as the latter’s
language might have suggested. There was considerable debate about
whether the formal emancipation of slaves in the Amendment
automatically conferred upon them the civil rights of citizens and
gave the federal government plenary power to enforce those rights.71
70.

Civil Rights Act of 1866, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.

71.

There has been a substantial historical literature on this issue. Compare
Robert Kaczorowski, The Supreme Court and Congress’s Power to
Enforce Constitutional Rights: A Moral Anomaly, 73 Ford. L. Rev.
153, 154 (2004) (concluding that plenary enforcement power was
anticipated by the Amendment), with Michael Les Benedict,
Preserving the Constitution 3–22 (2006) (arguing that federal
enforcement power was only triggered by the denial of rights by states).
In an earlier treatment of lower court cases decided between 1866 and
1873, Kaczorowski argued that “[j]udges expressed the belief that the
Reconstruction Amendments and the Civil Rights Act [of 1866] were
intended to establish the primacy of national citizenship and national
authority over the right of citizens.” Kaczorowski, supra note 9, at 5.
The cases that Kaczorowski discussed primarily involved challenges to
the constitutionality of the Act. He maintained that “judges uniformly
understood that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 expressed a legal theory
that assumed that Congress and the federal courts possessed primary
authority to protect civil rights because these rights were recognized and
secured by the United States Constitution as rights of American
citizenship.” Id. at 7. Having described the posture of judges between
1866 and 1873 in that fashion, Kaczorowski then argued that the Waite
Court retreated from that posture because it was “unable to devise a
theory for primary national civil rights authority that would have
permitted the states to continue to fulfill functions that the Court
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The issues were contested because the only obligations facially
imposed on states and private parties by the Amendment and the Act
were not to allow persons to be held in a condition of slavery and to
afford all citizens of the United States the same civil rights as white
citizens. States remained free to define state citizenship, with its
corresponding rights, as they chose. They could limit the category of
persons who were treated as state citizens, and accordingly restrict
the “civil rights” of a variety of their residents.
Until the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, then, the
federal government’s power to abolish slavery was unquestioned, and
its power to define national citizenship and the rights associated with
it established, but the states retained power to define state citizenship
and thereby limit both eligibility for that status and the rights
associated with it. Although states (and private parties) could not
treat nonwhite national citizens differently from white national
citizens, they could treat state residents differently in multiple ways.
A large residuum of state power to define the “civil rights” of
residents of states remained after the two enactments.
The Fourteenth Amendment arguably cut into that residuum of
state power significantly. The first clause of the Amendment’s first
section identified “all persons born or naturalized in the United
States” as both “citizens of the United States” and citizens of the
states in which they resided. That language did not in itself equate
state with national citizenship. But the Amendment’s next clause
declared that “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”
If those “privileges or immunities” were correlative to the “rights”
identified in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, then states were not merely
required to afford “all persons” the same privileges and immunities
they afforded white persons, but rather they could not “abridge” any
of them. They could not interfere with the rights of “all persons” to
make and enforce contracts; sue or be sued; or inherit, purchase, sell,
lease, hold, and convey property.72
In other words, if the “privileges and immunities” of citizens of
the United States amounted to the rights that antebellum
believed were essential to the survival of American federalism.” Id. at
183.
My analysis agrees with Kaczorowski’s conclusion that federalism issues
were important for the Chase and Waite Courts. But I disagree with his
assertion that there was a uniform understanding among state and
federal judges that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 gave Congress and the
federal courts authority to safeguard all the civil rights of American
citizens against state interference. In my view the meaning and scope of
“civil rights,” and their implications for federalism issues, were deeply
contested issues in the 1870s and 1880s.
72.

Civil Rights Act of 1866, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
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jurisprudence had implicitly understood as inherent in the status of
being a citizen, states could no longer limit those rights to a
comparatively small sector of their resident population. “All persons”
enjoyed those rights in the form of the “privileges or immunities” of
national citizenship, and states could not abridge them. Further, if
states did attempt to limit those rights, the federal judiciary could
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment against them.
But the Fourteenth Amendment only forbid state actors from
abridging the privileges or immunities of national citizenship, or
denying persons due process of law or the equal protection of the
laws.73 Unlike the strictures of the Thirteenth Amendment and the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, those of the Fourteenth Amendment did not
extend to private action. Thus after the passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the three enactments stood in a somewhat paradoxical
relationship to one another.
By imposing restrictions on the ability of states to restrict the
privileges and immunities of United States citizens, or to deny persons
due process of law or equal protection of the laws, the Fourteenth
Amendment had refocused the emphasis of “civil rights” in the post–
Civil War years. The emphasis of the Thirteenth Amendment and the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 had been on slavery and racial
discrimination. The civil rights protected in those enactments had
been the right to be free from involuntary servitude and the right of
black citizens to enjoy the same common law privileges as white
citizens. The Fourteenth Amendment broadened the category of
“privileges or immunities” to include rights unconnected to racial
status. At the same time it reaffirmed that those privileges or
immunities were being protected against the actions of states.
Here one can see how the legacy of “rights,” as they were
understood in antebellum jurisprudence, had invaded the
consciousness of the framers of Reconstruction-era civil rights
enactments. To the extent that Americans were thought of in the
antebellum years as citizens of “free republican governments,” those
governments were, on the whole, states.74 The list of privileges and
immunities cataloged in Corfield and restated in the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 was thought to be held against state governments. The
supporters of the Act who responded to charges that it threatened to
upset the balance between state and federal powers acknowledged
that states could impose conditions on such “rights” as access to

73.

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added) (“No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).

74.

See discussion supra Part I.
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courts, voting, and transferring property.75 It thus made sense for the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment’s framers to think of violations
of civil rights as primarily emanating from state officials.
2. The Federal Government as Enforcer of “Rights”

Since the federal judiciary was expected to be the chief
mechanism by which the constitutionality of alleged state
abridgements of the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States was to be tested, passage of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments assured that two issues would be in the forefront of civil
rights litigation. One, previously discussed, was the meaning of
“privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,” including
their enumeration and scope.76 The other was what conduct on the
part of a private party or state official could trigger the intervention
of the federal courts to ensure that civil rights would be protected.
Over the course of the 1870s and 1880s, the Supreme Court developed
a set of legal doctrines to govern that intervention.

III. The Judicial Fashioning of Enforcement
Rules for Civil Rights Cases
A.

United States v. Cruikshank

United States v. Cruikshank77 arose out of a massacre of between
sixty-two and eighty-one black men in Colfax, Louisiana, by a large
group of members of the Ku Klux Klan. The murdered men were
prospective voters in a state gubernatorial election.78 Three Klan
members were charged under a section of the Enforcement Act of
187079 that made it a felony for two or more persons to conspire to
“injure . . . any citizen with intent to prevent or hinder his free
exercise and enjoyment of any right or privilege granted or secured to
him by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”80
Three of the men convicted under the section challenged their
convictions in federal court in the Fifth Circuit, where Justice Joseph
P. Bradley was the circuit judge. Bradley took the occasion to write a
sweeping opinion in which he sought to clarify the reach of the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments and their
75.

Rutherglen, supra note 29, at 52, 56.

76.

See supra Parts I, II.

77.

92 U.S. 542 (1876).

78.

See Charles Lane, The Day Freedom Died: The Colfax
Massacre, the Supreme Court, and the Betrayal of Reconstruction 265–66 (2008).

79.

16 Stat. 140.

80.

Id. at 141.
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enforcement legislation.81 In that opinion Bradley addressed the effects
of the amendments on each of the ambiguous legacies of antebellum
civil rights jurisprudence: the nature of civil rights, the impact of the
amendments on private as well as state conduct, and the implications
of the federal government’s new enforcement powers for traditional
understandings of federalism. Although Bradley’s opinion only
represented the views of one circuit judge, it was widely distributed,
and the Court subsequently cited it in cases interpreting the state
action component of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.82
81.

United States v. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707 (C.C.D. La. 1874) (No.
14,897).

82.

Id. Bradley’s opinion, and a March 12, 1871, letter he wrote to thenfederal judge William B. Woods, have been noted by Nelson, supra
note 9, at 196, Collins, supra note 9, at 1985–86, 1988–1995; and
Brandwein, Rethinking Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 12–17,
93–112. In the letter, prompted by circuit court decisions interpreting
enforcement provisions of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments
and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Bradley said that “denying the equal
protection of the laws includes the omission to protect as well as the
omission to pass laws for protection . . . . Denying includes inaction as
well as action.” Letter from Justice Joseph Bradley to Judge William B.
Woods (on file with Joseph Bradley Papers, New Jersey Historical
Society). Although each of those scholars recognized that by 1871
Bradley had come to believe that civil rights could be infringed by
states through “inaction” as well as “action,” they made different uses of
that finding.
Nelson merely noted the affinity between Bradley’s 1871 position and
Justice John Marshall Harlan’s dissent in the Civil Rights Cases.
Nelson, supra note 9, at 195–96.
Collins, as part of an effort to demonstrate that Bradley’s constitutional
jurisprudence was consistent over time, emphasized that Bradley
distinguished between “preexisting” rights, which were only protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment when they were intentionally or
negligently violated by states, and “newly conferred” rights, such as the
right to be free from the condition of slavery conferred by the
Thirteenth Amendment and the right “to vote free of racial
discrimination” conferred by the Fifteenth Amendment. The federal
government could protect the latter set of rights against interference by
private as well as state actors. Collins, supra note 9, at 1990–93.
Brandwein fastened on the “inaction as well as action” language in
Bradley’s letter to Woods and his distinction between preexisting and
conferred rights to suggest that several Reconstruction-era constitutional
decisions by the Supreme Court can be understood as pivoting on what
she calls the concept of “state neglect” (inaction that caused the denial
of civil rights) and the “Fifteenth Amendment exception” (the view that
the right to vote free of racial discrimination could be protected against
private as well as state action). Brandwein, Rethinking
Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 12–17. She maintained that “a new
understanding of the judicial settlement of Reconstruction” emerges
from a focus on those concepts. Id. at 17.
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We have seen that the existing categories of antebellum rights
jurisprudence suggested that the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments, together with the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
were addressing two different sorts of rights. The rights associated
with “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” were
natural rights, enjoyed by all citizens of free republican governments
and held against states.83 Thus in making reference to the privileges or
immunities of national citizenship, due process of law, or equal
protection of the laws, the Fourteenth Amendment did not create any
new rights. “Due process of law” was equated with the privileges and
immunities identified in Corfield and Luther v. Borden, and “equal
protection of the laws” was equated with the right of all citizens to
safety, security, and like treatment before the courts.84
In contrast, Bradley saw the Thirteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments as creating new rights. In abolishing slavery, the
Thirteenth Amendment had, as Bradley put it in his circuit court
opinion in Cruikshank, created “a positive right that did not exist
before.”85 That was correct in the sense that slaves had been denied
the right of freedom and that African Americans, but not whites, had
been treated as eligible for slave status. But freedom and equal
treatment before the law had been natural rights at common law. In
contrast, the right not to have one’s vote “abridged . . . on account of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude” had been created by
the Fifteenth Amendment. It was, Bradley noted, a “right . . . to be
exempt from the disability of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude, as respects the right to vote.”86 This made it, in the
language of antebellum civil rights jurisprudence, a “political” rather
than a “natural” right.
Bradley would make use of that distinction in Cruikshank,
adopting the vocabulary of antebellum jurisprudence employed for
different categories of rights, which referred to natural rights as
“secured,” “declared,” or “guaranteed,” and political rights as
I agree with each of those scholars that a distinction between “secured”
and “created” civil rights (to use terminology employed by
contemporaries) and a recognition that a state’s infringement of civil
rights could arise from inaction as well as action were crucial to the
constitutional jurisprudence of the Reconstruction era. My primary
purpose in emphasizing those features, however, is to demonstrate the
fluidity of the category of civil rights, and the abiding concern of
Supreme Court justices with retaining something like the antebellum
relationship between state and federal power, in that period.
83.

See discussion supra Part I.

84.

See generally Rutherglen, supra note 29, at 74.

85.

Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. at 712.

86.

Id.
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“granted, given, or conferred.” In Cruikshank, Bradley alluded to
“every right and privilege given or guarantied [sic] by the
constitution”87 and also to “rights and privileges” that “are secured in
the constitution” rather than being “created or conferred by the
constitution.”88
The different categories of rights, Bradley believed, triggered
different allocations of power to enforce them.89 When natural rights
were at issue, the federal government’s enforcement power was
contingent on a state’s denial of the rights. This was because, at
common law, natural rights existed against state governments.90 The
ordinary criminal laws of a state, for example, were designed to
prevent the state from infringing the rights of citizens to life and
liberty; only when a state infringed or failed to protect one’s rights
could the federal government step in to enforce them.
Created, or political, rights were different. They represented an
effort on part of the framers of constitutional provisions to add to the
stock of rights enjoyed by Americans. In Bradley’s view, this meant
that it was not necessary to have a showing of willful or negligent
state failure to enforce the rights before the federal government could
step in to enforce them.91 Given his view that the Fifteenth
Amendment “substantially guaranties [sic] the equal right to vote to
citizens of every race and color,” Bradley was “inclined to the opinion
that congress has the power to secure that right not only against the
unfriendly operation of state laws, but against outrage, violence, and
combinations on the part of individuals, irrespective of the state
laws.”92
There were textual difficulties with Bradley’s position. Although
he understood the language of the Thirteenth Amendment as being
categorical, “a positive declaration that slavery shall not exist,”93 and
therefore applicable to private individuals as well as states or the
federal government, the Thirteenth Amendment only covered slavery.
The Fifteenth Amendment’s language governed voting rights of the
87.

Id. at 710.

88.

Id. For more detail, see Collins, supra note 9, at 1992–94; Brandwein,
Rethinking Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 94–101.

89.

My analysis of Bradley’s Cruikshank opinion is indebted to Collins,
supra note 9, at 1990–95; and to Brandwein, Rethinking
Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 94–101.

90.

Collins, supra note 9, at 1990–91. See also Brandwein, Rethinking
Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 97–98.

91.

Brandwein, Rethinking Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 95, 99;
Collins, supra note 9, at 1991–92.

92.

25 F. Cas. a t 7 1 3 .

93.

Id. at 711.
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sort that the defendants in Cruikshank had disrupted, but that
amendment contained the same state action limitations as the
Fourteenth Amendment. How, then, could action by private parties
to deprive black citizens of voting rights be made the basis of a
federal offense?94
In his circuit opinion in Cruikshank, Bradley sought to circumvent
those difficulties by drawing upon the antebellum distinction between
natural and political rights. Whereas the former category of rights
was held against state governments, the latter category had been
created by constitutional provisions. This meant, for Bradley, that the
powers of the federal government to enforce rights “will depend on the
character of the right . . . .”95 If the federal government were to have
power to enforce natural rights against states, it could “pass laws for
the general preservation of social order in every state,”96 transforming
the traditional relations between it and the states. Thus with respect
to natural or secured rights, the enforcement role for the federal
government was that of an overseer, only becoming active when states
failed, either deliberately or inadvertently, to protect those rights.97
Since there was no language in the Thirteenth Amendment or the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 limiting violations of the designated civil
rights to states or the federal government, Bradley acknowledged that
the Amendment’s prohibitions could be enforced against individuals.
But, he pointed out, the Amendment and the Act did not state that
no institutions or individuals could violate the civil rights listed in the
Act. They merely stated that no persons in the United States could
be slaves and that all citizens were required to be given the same
privileges and immunities as white citizens. Bradley read this
language as authorizing Congress to intervene only when the civil
rights of citizens were interfered with because of racial animus.98 “To
constitute an offense . . . of which congress and the courts of the
United States have a right to take cognizance under [the Thirteenth]
amendment,” he maintained, “there must be a design to injure a
person . . . by reason of his race, color, or previous condition of
servitude. Otherwise it is a case exclusively within the jurisdiction of
the state and its courts.”99

94.

See Brandwein, Rethinking Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 98–
102.

95.

Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. at 710.

96.

Id.

97.

See Brandwein, Rethinking Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 97–
98; Collins, supra note 9, at 1991.

98.

Brandwein, Rethinking Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 101–02.

99.

Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. at 712.
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The first step in Bradley’s analysis was thus to confine federal
enforcement of state or private violations of civil rights to those
violations made because of racial animus. The next step was to
surmount, in some instances, the state action limitations of the
Fifteenth Amendment. Here again Bradley made use of the
antebellum distinction between natural and political rights, while
retaining the distinguishing feature of racial animus. Because voting
rights were conferred, political rights, the federal government could
enforce them against usurpations by private individuals as well as
states. It could also enforce them if states neglected to uphold them
as well as when they deliberately withheld them. But a showing of
racial animus was still necessary to trigger federal intervention.100 This
enabled Bradley to dismiss all the indictments against the defendants
in Cruikshank. All that had been shown was that the defendants
assaulted citizens who happened to be black: that was an “ordinary
crime,” cognizable only in the state courts. To show that the
defendants had conspired to deprive the black citizens of their voting
rights, it was necessary to establish a racial motive.101
The Supreme Court subsequently ratified Bradley’s dismissal of
the indictment in United States v. Cruikshank,102 and that decision
has conventionally been regarded as undermining the federal
government’s efforts to protect black citizens against usurpations of
their rights, with one commentator asserting that Cruikshank “shaped
the Constitution to the advantage of the Ku Klux Klan.”103 But
although Bradley allowed the defendants in Cruikshank, who were
very likely motivated by racial animus, to escape punishment, his
opinion also offered three suggestions for the federal courts in their
efforts to enforce the voting rights of blacks in the South.

100. Brandwein, Rethinking Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 98–100;
Collins, supra note 9, at 1992.
101. The defendants in Cruikshank had been indicted under Section 6 of the
Enforcement Act of 1870, designed to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment.
That section made it a felony for two or more persons to conspire to
“injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen with intent to
prevent or hinder his free exercise and enjoyment of any right or
privilege granted or secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the
United States.” 16 Stat. 140, 141. Because Bradley found that section
“not confined to cases of [racial] discrimination,” he concluded it was
“not supported by the constitution.” Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. at 715.
102. 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
103. Leonard W. Levy, United States v. Cruikshank, in Leonard W. Levy
et al., 2 Encyclopedia of the American Constitution 733 (2d
ed. 2000).
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One suggestion has been described as the doctrine of “state
neglect.”104 Bradley indicated that although individual violations of
civil rights were not covered by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, if states neglected to provide citizens relief against
deprivations of their rights, the federal government could intervene.
Another followed from Bradley’s distinction between the
enforcement powers of the federal government where natural and
political rights were concerned. When a right “conferred” by the
Constitution was being usurped by a state or an individual, he
maintained, the federal government could enforce the right
notwithstanding state action limitations. The Fifteenth Amendment
was an example of conferred or political rights. In a passage in his
Cruikshank circuit opinion, Bradley said that “[i]f in a community or
neighborhood composed principally of whites, a citizen of African
descent . . . should propose to lease and cultivate a farm, and a
combination should be formed to . . . prevent him from the
accomplishment of his purpose on account of his race or color, it
cannot be doubted that this would be a case within the power of
congress to remedy and redress.”105 Similarly, although the Fifteenth
Amendment did not grant unrestricted rights to vote, it did confer a
right not to have the opportunity to vote restricted because of race or
color. Bradley concluded that had racial animus been shown in
Cruikshank, the federal government could have successfully indicted
the defendants in that case for conspiracy to deprive black citizens of
their voting rights.106
The third mechanism by which the federal government could
protect the voting rights of blacks was simply alluded to by Bradley
in his Cruikshank opinion. This was the “times, places and manner”
clause of Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution, which gave Congress
the power to “make or alter such Regulations” as “shall be prescribed
104. The term was coined by Pamela Brandwein in Brandwein,
Rethinking Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 14. It describes
Bradley’s conclusion in his 1871 letter to Woods that the federal
government could violate citizens’ civil rights by inaction, previously
noted by Nelson, supra note 9, at 196, and Collins, supra note 9, at
1985–86, 1988–95. See also Harold M. Hyman & William M.
Wiecek, Equal Justice Under Law 435–36 (1982) (hereinafter
Equal Justice Under Law) (“[T]he federal government had both a
right and a duty under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to
reach into states in order to inhibit the actions of state officials or
individuals intended to deprive citizens of . . . rights.”) and Robert J.
Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil
War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 863, 919, 937 (1986)
(noting that state infringement of civil rights could come from
“inaction” as well as “action”).
105. 25 F. Cas. at 712.
106. Collins, supra note 9, at 1995.
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in each State by the Legislature thereof” as to “[t]he Times, Places,
and Manner of holding [federal] Elections . . . .”107 That clause
appeared to give the federal government plenary power to protect the
right to vote in national elections.
Pamela Brandwein has shown that in cases decided between 1874
and 1876, lower federal courts and the Supreme Court picked up on
all of Bradley’s suggestions.108 In three cases involving efforts by
individuals to harass, assault, or murder African Americans in
connection with voting, federal judges, in charges to grand juries,
made it clear that if racial animus was shown, federal authorities
could punish private individuals for those actions if state authorities
had not done so.109 Those charges retained the racial animus
requirement for any federal intervention but also linked the concepts
of state neglect and political rights. Ordinarily assaults, batteries, or
murders were state crimes, but when the motivation of the defendants
was racially based and the actions were efforts to deprive black
citizens of Fifteenth Amendment rights, the federal government, on a
showing of state neglect, could intervene.
B. United States v. Reese

In 1876, the Supreme Court reviewed Bradley’s decision in
Cruikshank and a companion case where officials in Lexington,
Kentucky, had refused to count the vote of an African American, also
retaining the concept of state neglect, as well as insisting that federal
prosecutions under the Fifteenth Amendment or the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 could only be brought if a racial motive was asserted. The
companion case, United States v. Reese,110 has, like Cruikshank, been
treated as evidence of the Court’s hostility to Reconstruction because
“state action” was clearly involved and the Court dismissed the
indictment.111

107. U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
108. See Brandwein, Rethinking Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 108–
26.
109. The cases were United States v. Blackburn, 24 F. Cas. 1158 (C.C.W.D.
Mo. 1874) (No. 14,603) (Judge Arnold Krekel); Charge to Grand Jury—
Civil Rights Act, 30 F. Cas. 1005 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1875) (No. 18,260)
(Judge Halmer Emmons); and [unnamed case from Oct. 1874], (reported
in New York Times, Oct. 24, 1874, at p. 1 and also in Chicago
Tribune, Oct. 24, 1874, at p. 7) (Judge Bland Ballard).
110. 92 U.S. 214 (1876).
111. E.g., Leonard W. Levy, Reese v. United States, in Leonard W. Levy
et al., 5 Encyclopedia of the American Constitution 2145 (2d
ed. 2000) (“The Supreme Court crippled the attempt of the federal
government to protect the right to vote and made constitutionally
possible the circumvention of the Fifteenth Amendment . . . .”).
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But Reese, like Cruikshank, was based on the Court’s
understanding that racial animus was required where the federal
government was seeking to penalize violations of Fifteenth
Amendment voting rights. In Cruikshank no racial animus had been
shown. In Reese it could be presumed because the prospective voter
was black, but an 1874 codification of the Enforcement Act of 1870,
on which the federal prosecution was based, had failed to include
language prohibiting only those denials of voting made “on account of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”112 The sections under
which the defendants in Reese had been indicted were thus
unconstitutionally broad.
Two passages in Chief Justice Morrison Waite’s opinion for the
Court in Reese demonstrated that the Court had entertained each of
Bradley’s suggestions for the federal enforcement of voting rights.113
One, referring to the failure of the indictment in Reese to allege racial
animus, stated, “It is only when the wrongful refusal at such an
election is because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude,
that Congress can interfere, and provide for its punishment.”114
Although the passage was chiefly directed toward disposing of the
indictment, it contained all of the elements of the Court’s
jurisprudence of federal voting rights cases in the South. The “right”
at stake was that of not having one’s voting rights in a municipal
election discriminated against on the basis of race, a Fifteenth
Amendment right. Federal intervention was triggered by the
“wrongful” refusal of access to voting. That refusal could be the result
of the action of state officials (as in Reese) or private individuals (as
in Cruikshank). It also could be the result of inaction on the part of
state officials: state neglect. Neither official action nor intentional
conduct was necessary to trigger federal intervention.
In addition, Waite said that “[t]he effect of art. 1, sect. 4, of the
Constitution, in respect to election for senators and representatives, is
not now under consideration.”115 That provision would play a role in
the Court’s subsequent voting rights cases. It was not relevant in
Reese because that case involved a municipal election, and the article
pertained to national elections.116 But the Clause gave Congress the
power to make “regulations” for those elections, including the
“manner” of holding them, and it did not require a showing of racial
112. 92 U.S. at 218.
113. Both passages are discussed in Brandwein, Rethinking Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 123, 125.
114. 92 U.S. at 218.
115. Id.
116. The clause provides that states may elect the times, places, and manner
of holding elections for Senators and Representatives, but Congress may
alter these regulations. U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
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animus to be enforced. So it appeared to be a basis for the positioning
of federal officials to uphold African American voting rights in the
South.
Two months before the 1876 presidential election, Attorney
General Alphonso Taft issued a circular deploying Federal Marshals
to several Southern states to enforce “the peace of the United States”
in federal elections. He based his authority on Article I, Section 4, and
noted that in the Reese case the Court had indicated that it was not
considering that provision. Reese, Taft said, “arose upon an election
of State officers, only, and this order relates to the election of Federal
officers, only.”117
The above actions by the Court and the Grant administration
demonstrate that without knowing the doctrinal setting of Court
decisions in the years immediately following the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, it
is easy to gain a false impression of those decisions. Distinctions such
as that between secured and created rights, or between ordinary
crimes and the actions specially sanctioned by the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments, were crucial for Justices who wanted to
acknowledge the federal government’s power to enforce the
Amendments’ provisions but did not want to radically disturb
antebellum understandings of the relationship between state and
federal powers.
The differential treatment of violations of voting rights in state
and federal elections captured those concerns. Where state elections
were concerned, as in Cruikshank and Reese, the power of the federal
government to oversee the conduct of state officials and private
individuals was limited to actions motivated by racial animus (or by
the disinclination of state officials to correct private actions of that
sort). To allow the federal government to enforce voting rights
without evidence that those rights had been restricted because of
racial animus was to invite undue interference with state prerogatives.
But no such concern was present in federal elections. Here, the rights
were created rights, which extended to all voters, so the federal
government’s supervisory power need not be limited to instances of
racial discrimination. Stationing federal marshals in Southern states
to regulate the process of federal elections was not an unwarranted
extension of federal power.118
117. Taft’s circular was reprinted in the New York Times, Sept. 5, 1876, at
p.2. Brandwein, Rethinking Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 130–
39, calls attention to the circular as evidence that the Grant
administration had picked up on Bradley’s and Waite’s suggestions
about the role of Article I, Section 4 in voting rights cases.
118. Brandwein, Rethinking Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 133,
argues that “Waite had signaled [the] availability [of the Article I,
Section 4 argument]. So had Bradley. Taft was . . . . taking [the Court’s]
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Brandwein has also shown that three cases decided between 1877
and 1884 can be seen as illustrating the continuing vitality, in those
years, of the doctrinal guideposts first introduced by Bradley in his
circuit court opinion in Cruikshank.119 The first decision was a circuit
opinion by Waite in United States v. Butler.120 In September 1876,
members of “rifle clubs” in Aiken County, South Carolina, sought to
intimidate African Americans from participating in forthcoming
elections by besieging and shooting them. In a riot near the town of
Ellenton, many African Americans were killed, and some retaliated by
killing whites. Federal troops were dispatched to the area, and twelve
rifle club members were arrested, including Andrew Pickens Butler, a
former colonel in the Confederate army.
The federal government, pursuing the lines laid out in Taft’s
circular, brought an indictment against Butler and the others based
on two theories. One was under Article I, Section 4; the other under
the Fifteenth Amendment and the Enforcement Act of 1870. In his
charge to the jury, Waite followed the Cruikshank rules for federal
enforcement of civil rights. For the three counts under Article I,
Section 4, Waite made it clear that the federal government had a
general power to police federal elections and that no racial animus on
the part of those interfering with them needed to be shown. For the
two counts under the Fifteenth Amendment, Waite concluded that
the “controlling element” to make out a successful indictment was a
showing that those indicted had conspired to deprive African
Americans of the opportunity to vote on the basis of their race.121
In the second case, Ex parte Siebold,122 the Supreme Court relied
on Article I, Section 4 to secure the convictions of five Maryland
election officials who stuffed ballot boxes and allowed others to be
destroyed in a national election. They were charged under election
cue.” Although Taft might have noted those “signals,” as Attorney
General of the United States, he was in a position to pay attention to
constitutional provisions affecting voting in federal elections.
119. See id. at 144–51.
120. 25 F. Cas. 213 (C.C.D.S.C. 1877) (No. 14,700). Butler had received
comparatively little attention from scholars before Brandwein, who
discusses it in Brandwein, Rethinking Reconstruction, supra note
9, at 145–47. After Waite’s charge to the jury, it deadlocked,
presumably along racial lines, resulting in no conviction. For more
detail, see Lou Faulkner Williams, Federal Enforcement of Black Rights
in the Post-Redemption South: The Ellenton Riot Case, in Local
Matters: Race, Crime, and Justice in the Nineteenth-Century
South 172–89 (Christopher Waldrep & Donald G. Nieman eds., 2001).
121. 25 F. Cas. at 223–24.
122. 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
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laws that called for the prosecution of state officials who refused to
perform duties in national elections or interfered with the duties of
federal officials. They sought a writ of habeas corpus after being
imprisoned on the ground that keeping the peace was a duty reserved
for state officials. The Court, in an opinion written by Bradley, held
that the federal government had a power to police national elections
and could compel state officials to assist federal officials in that task.
The election laws sanctioning state officials for not cooperating in the
policing of federal elections were valid implementations of the Times,
Places, and Manner Clause of Article I, Section 4.123
The third case, Ex parte Yarbrough,124 involved another effort to
interfere with voting by African Americans in a federal election. Five
members of the Klu Klux Klan beat a Georgia black voter.
Indictments were brought under the Fifteenth Amendment and
Article I, Section 4. A unanimous Supreme Court upheld the
indictments against arguments that state action was necessary to
convict under the Fifteenth Amendment and that the right to vote for
a member of Congress was governed by state law. Justice Miller
explained the Court’s rationale:
The reference to cases in this court in which the power of
congress under the first section of the fourteenth amendment
has been held to relate alone to acts done under state authority
can afford petitioners no aid in the present case. . . . [A]cts
which are mere invasions of private rights[ and] have no
sanction in the statutes of a state, or . . . are not committed by
any one exercising its authority, are [normally] not within the
scope of that amendment, [but] it is quite a different matter
when congress undertakes to protect the citizen in the exercise
of rights conferred by the constitution of the United States . . .
.125

Violations of “secured” rights thus required state action under the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, but not violations of
“conferred” rights, and, as Miller explained, by protecting African
Americans against discrimination in voting “whenever the right to
vote may be granted to others,” the Fifteenth Amendment
“substantially confer[red] on the negro the right to vote, and Congress
has the power to protect and enforce that right.”126 Moreover, the
right to vote for a member of Congress was not dependent on state
law, as in the case of voting rights generally. It was “created by the
123. Id. at 394–95, 399.
124. 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
125. Id. at 665–66.
126. Id. at 665.
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Constitution,” and thus the federal government had plenary power to
endorse it.127
Brandwein’s readings of the above decisions suggest that the
Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence in “civil rights” cases
had crystallized around three propositions between the early 1870s
and the mid-1880s. First, the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
had left the antebellum category of “natural” or “secured” rights
essentially undisturbed, and the definition of those rights continued to
be a matter of state law. Second, however, the Civil Rights Act of
1866 and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, taken together,
prohibited states, and in some instances private individuals, from
restricting rights conferred by the Constitution, the foremost example
of which was the right of all citizens to vote in federal elections.
Third, some cases had suggested that the federal government had
power to enforce the “secured” rights of individuals if states neglected
to
enforce them.
The context in which those propositions had been formulated had
typically been that of efforts on the part of African Americans to vote
in state or federal elections. With respect to state elections,
interference with those efforts, such as assaults on prospective African
American voters, required racial animus, and voting in state elections
was designated a “secured” right, one that could be restricted by state
law. With respect to federal elections, voting rights were placed in a
different category. They were designated “conferred” rights,
constitutionally created civil rights whose enforcement was not
dependent on state law or on the actions of state officials. Most
prominent among those was the right not to have one’s opportunity
to vote in federal elections restricted on the basis of race. The right of
African Americans to vote in federal elections could be enforced by
the federal government either under the Fifteenth Amendment or
under the Times, Places, and Manner Clause of Article I, Section 4.
Finally, systematic failure on the part of state authorities to
enforce the right of African Americans to vote in state elections could
result in intervention by the federal government to protect that right.
If, for example, private individuals sought to harass or intimidate
African American voters in state elections, and state authorities took
no action to prevent that conduct, their neglect could amount to
sufficient “state action” to trigger the enforcement provisions of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
The endorsement of those propositions by the Supreme Court in
the two decades following the Civil War suggests that the
conventional view of the Court as contributing to a retreat from the
initial goals of Reconstruction needs modification. The conventional
127. Id. at 663–64.
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view characterizes the Court as abandoning the egalitarian promise of
Reconstruction in two respects: by allowing violent reprisals against
African Americans in Southern states to go unpunished unless explicit
racial animus was shown, and by declining to interpret the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments as charters for new federal
civil rights.128
Brandwein’s analysis of voting rights cases in the 1870s and 1880s
reveals that the conventional view is misplaced.129 First, the Court
signaled that where state authorities had neglected to enforce the civil
rights of individuals, federal authorities could step in to enforce those
rights. Second, the Court distinguished between civil rights that were
“secured” and those that had been “conferred” or “created” by the
Constitution, and indicated that neither states nor private individuals
could infringe on the latter set of rights. Thus in one group of cases,
where states allegedly restricted the opportunities of blacks to sue in
the courts, or own property, it was necessary to show an institutional
pattern of failure to allow the enjoyment of those rights for federal
enforcement to take place; in another, where states or private
individuals allegedly interfered with the efforts of blacks to vote in
federal elections, nothing but an interference needed to be shown.130
From the perspective of federalism, the Court’s approach to civil
rights cases did not represent the abdication of federal enforcement
suggested by the conventional view. Although, as we will see, the
Court treated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments as only
creating a limited number of federal civil rights, it treated the federal
government both as an overseer of state governments with respect to
the accommodation of “secured” civil rights and as an enforcer of
“created” federal civil rights. In those capacities, the federal
government could be expected to encroach into state sovereignty.
D. “Civil Rights” and the Slaughter-House and Civil Rights Cases

How might the Court’s two most prominent decisions interpreting
Reconstruction enactments, the Slaughter-House Cases131 (1873) and
the Civil Rights Cases132 (1883), be understood once attention has
been drawn to the distinction between “secured” and “created” civil
128. In addition to Foner, supra note 8, evidence of this view can be found
in Equal Justice Under Law, supra note 104, at 493, and
Kaczorowski, supra note 9, at 187.
129. As she puts it, “The two-pronged voting rights jurisprudence elaborated
between 1877 and 1884 rested on the Fifteenth Amendment and Article
I, Section 4. State action limitations did not apply.” Brandwein,
Rethinking Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 144–45.
130. Id.
131. 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
132. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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rights, to the race-based character of the “created” rights category,
and to the overlapping treatment of intentional and negligent state
infringements on rights? The conventional view of both decisions is
that their majority opinions contributed to the demise of the
egalitarian ideals of Reconstruction and encouraged the reemergence
of white supremacist governments in former Confederate states.133
When language in those opinions is matched up with language in
earlier cases, however, the opinions can be seen as retaining, rather
than transforming, the distinctive, and ambivalent, vocabulary of
“civil rights” as the category evolved out of antebellum
jurisprudence.134
1. The Slaughter-House Cases

Recent scholarship on the Slaughter-House Cases has corrected
one historiographical stereotype: that the Louisiana legislation
challenged in the cases, which granted an exclusive franchise to the
Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughtering Company,
created a monopoly and was passed by a corrupt legislature. In fact,
the company granted the franchise was required to allow all butchers
to use its facilities and subjected to fines if it did not do so. The
rationale for creating an exclusive franchise was to make the business
of slaughtering animals less of a public health hazard by ensuring that
slaughtering would take place in one facility that could be regularly
inspected. Although the butchers who challenged the legislation
invoked anti-monopoly and anti-corruption rhetoric, the invocations
133. See Harold M. Hyman, Slaughterhouse Cases, in Levy et al., 5
Encyclopedia of the American Constitution 2423 (2d ed. 2000)
(“[Justice Samuel] Miller separated federal from state privileges and
immunities. He assigned to the states the definition of ordinary
marketplace relationships essential to the vast majority of people. More
important, he assigned to state privileges and immunities all basic civil
liberties and rights, excluding them from federal protection. Miller’s
sweeping interpretation relegated everyone, including Negroes, who had
assumed that the Fourteenth Amendment had assigned the federal
government the role of ‘guardian democracy’ over state-defined civil
rights, to the state governments for effective protection.”). See also
Leonard W. Levy, Civil Rights Cases, in Levy et al., 2 Encyclopedia
of the American Constitution 408 (2d ed. 2000) (“[The Court’s
opinion] had the effect of reinforcing racist attitudes and practices, while
emasculating a heroic effort by Congress and the President to prevent
the growth of a Jim Crow society. The Court also emasculated the
Fourteenth Amendment’s enforcement clause, section five.”).
134. Although the emphasis in my discussion of the Slaughter-House Cases
and the Civil Rights Cases differs from Brandwein’s analysis, we are
both suggesting that the typology of civil rights present in Bradley’s
Cruikshank opinion can be seen in the opinions in both of those cases.
See Brandwein, Rethinking Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 57–
58, 163–65.
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were disingenuous. The butchers had a virtual monopoly of the
slaughtering trade prior to the legislation’s passage and had
collectively ignored health regulations and inflated the prices of meat.
Louisiana had a tradition of legislative corruption, and support of the
butchers’ arguments by white residents of New Orleans was more of a
protest against the fact that the Louisiana legislature included black
representatives than a concern about it being corrupt. Other cities
had regulated the slaughtering trade by invoking the police power of
states and municipalities to promote public health.135
That same scholarship has remained wedded, however, to another
stereotype about the Slaughter-House Cases: that Justice Samuel
Miller’s majority opinion began the post–Civil War judicial
abandonment of African Americans by construing the privileges or
immunities and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment narrowly.136 If, however, one reads Miller’s opinion
against the backdrop of antebellum conceptions of citizenship, Miller’s
private correspondence, and the cases previously discussed, it is clear
that although he did undertake a narrow reading of the clauses, he
did so in part because he anticipated that an effect of the Fourteenth
Amendment might be to impose a new set of restrictions on the
ability of states to define the scope of “civil rights.”137 Moreover,
Miller did not find a narrow reading of the clauses incompatible with
judicial protection of the civil rights of black residents of southern
states.
The key to understanding Miller’s construction of the
Reconstruction Amendments in the Slaughter-House Cases is to
135. See Ronald M. Labbé & Jonathan Lurie, The Slaughterhouse
Cases 17–102 (2003); Michael A. Ross, Justice of Shattered
Dreams 189–99 (2003).
136. Labbe & Lurie, supra note 135, at 211–21; Ross, supra note 135, at
200–04.
137. There is considerable evidence that the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment were concerned about the restriction of Bill of Rights
guarantees by Southern states in the antebellum years, and thus
anticipated that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment would be interpreted as incorporating many of those
guarantees and applying them against the states. See generally Michael
Kent Curtis, No State Shall Abridge: The Fourteenth
Amendment and the Bill of Rights (1986). See also the comment
by John Bingham in the course of debates over the Fourteenth
Amendment, declaring that “[t]here was a want hitherto, and there
remains a want now, in the Constitution of our country, which the
proposed amendment will supply. What is that? It is the power . . . to
protect by national law the privileges and immunities of all the citizens
of the Republic and the inborn rights of every person within its
jurisdiction.” Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2542 (1866).
Additional comments along the same lines can be found in Foner,
supra note 8, at 228–80.
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recognize that he retained antebellum conceptions of “civil rights” and
accompanying antebellum assumptions about federalism. His
conclusion that the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments, taken together, had “one pervading purpose . . . lying
at the foundation of each . . . the freedom of the slave race, the
security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of
the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those
who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him,”138 was the
same conclusion that Bradley, Waite, and he would derive in
Cruikshank, Reese, and federal voting rights cases. Racial animus was
necessary to make out a Thirteenth, Fourteenth, or Fifteenth
Amendment violation because the protection of African Americans lay
behind each of those Amendments.139
Hence the Fourteenth Amendment, Miller maintained, evolved
out of a recognition that even after the abolition of slavery “the
condition of the slave race” in former slave states “would, without
further protection of the federal government, be almost as bad as it
was before” because “[a]mong the first acts of legislation” in those
states “were laws which . . . curtailed [the rights of freed slaves] in the
pursuit of life, liberty, and property to such an extent that their
freedom was of little value . . . .”140 Miller particularized:
They were in some States forbidden to appear in the towns in
any other character than menial servants. They were required to
reside on and cultivate the soil without the right to purchase or
own it. They were excluded from many occupations of gain, and
were not permitted to give testimony in the courts in any case
where a white man was a party. It was said that their lives were
at the mercy of bad men, either because the laws for their
protection were insufficient or were not enforced.141

Further, the Fifteenth Amendment was the product of a recognition
by “the thoughtful men who had been the authors of the other two
amendments” that those “were inadequate for the protection of life,
liberty, and property, without which freedom to the slave was no
boon.”142 This was because former slaves “were in all those States
denied the right of suffrage. The laws were administered by the white
man alone.”143 Hence, “[t]he negro having, by the [F]ourteenth
[A]mendment, been declared to be a citizen of the United States,” was
138. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 71.
139. Id. at 71–72
140. Id. at 70.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 71.
143. Id.
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“made a voter in every state of the Union”144 by the Fifteenth
Amendment.
Note that the same implicit understandings about civil rights and
the indifference of former slave states to their exercise by African
Americans that we have observed in Cruikshank, Reese, and the
voting rights cases appear in Miller’s Slaughter-House opinion.
Although pursuing a calling, owning property, or giving testimony in
the courts were examples of antebellum “secured” or “natural” rights,
they were rights connected with state citizenship. Once slaves were
freed by the Thirteenth Amendment, states still had no obligation to
treat them as citizens, and Miller’s list of practices suggested that
many did not.145 The declaration in the Fourteenth Amendment that
freed slaves were citizens of states was designed to deal with those
practices. But African Americans continued to be disenfranchised in
former slave states, which meant that their life, liberty, and property
could still be curtailed. Hence the enactment of the Fifteenth
Amendment, which created a civil right not to have one’s ability to
vote restricted on the basis of race.146 The Fifteenth Amendment
could be enforced by the federal government if states declined to
uphold the right to vote.
Miller thus seems to have anticipated that the principal role of
the federal government as an enforcer of violations of civil rights in
the states would come in the area of voting rights. Outside that area,
it was necessary to show that a state actor had deprived a citizen of a
civil right, either by intentional conduct or negligent conduct (as
where state laws were “insufficient” or “not enforced”). One
illustration of this role was when states declined to allow African
Americans to own property or to give testimony in court. In such
instances, Miller anticipated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause coming into play. Indeed, he thought that to be the
primary purpose of the Clause. “The existence of laws in the States
where the newly emancipated negroes resided, which discriminated
with gross injustice and hardship against them as a class,” he wrote in
his Slaughter-House opinion, “was the evil to be remedied by this
clause . . . .”147 So “[i]f . . . the States did not conform their laws to its
requirements,” the federal government could intervene under Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.148
Miller’s discussion of the Equal Protection Clause in the
Slaughter-House Cases has typically been singled out for its
144. Id.
145. Id. at 70.
146. Id. at 71.
147. Id. at 81.
148. Id.
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purportedly narrow interpretation of that clause, with emphasis on his
comment that “[w]e doubt very much whether any action of a State
not directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class,
or on account of their race, will ever be held to come within the
purview of this provision.”149 But for present purposes the important
feature of Miller’s discussion of the Equal Protection Clause is that he
viewed it as a measure designed to give the federal government
corrective power when the rights of state citizens were discriminated
against by states on the basis of race. Under this reading, the Equal
Protection Clause was not safeguarding the rights of national citizens,
nor was it a basis for federal intervention in most instances where a
state curtailed “natural” or “secured” rights. If a state, for example,
restricted the opportunities of women or male non-freeholders to vote
in state or local elections, that was not a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. Only when a state allowed some opportunities to
its white citizens and denied them to its black citizens could the
Clause come into play.150
The above reading of Miller’s view of the Equal Protection Clause
seems consistent with two other features of his Slaughter-House
opinion, both of which have figured prominently in the conventional
account of the opinion as beginning a judicial retreat from the
egalitarian vision of Reconstruction. The first feature is Miller’s
narrow construction of the “privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States” under the Fourteenth Amendment. The second, and
related, feature is Miller’s claim that the Reconstruction Amendments
were not designed “to transfer the security and protection of all . . .
civil rights . . . from the States to the federal government,” and
therefore “to bring within the [enforcement] power of Congress the
entire domain of civil rights heretofore belonging exclusively to the
States.”151
In the cases decided between 1874 and 1884, previously discussed,
we have seen that Justices on the Waite Court distinguished between
classes of what were coming to be generically called civil rights:
“natural” or “secured” rights, “created” or “conferred” rights.152 The
latter category was small, restricted to rights that were enacted in
provisions of constitutional amendments, such as the Fifteenth
Amendment’s right not to have one’s ability to vote restricted on the
149. Id.
150. Id. (“It is so clearly a provision for that race and that emergency that a
strong case would be necessary for its application to any other.”).
151. Id. at 77. In contrast, Justice Bradley thought that among the
“privileges and immunities” included in the Fourteenth Amendment
were those enumerated in the first eight amendments to the
Constitution. Id. at 118–19 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
152. See, supra Part IV.A–C.
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basis of race. Most of the “civil rights” described in the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, and most of the “privileges and immunities” identified by
Washington in Corfield, were “natural” or “secured” rights. That class
of rights was associated with state, not national citizenship, and was
subject to, as Washington put it, “such restraints as the government
may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole.”153
When one superimposes a map of federal and state power onto
this categorization of “civil rights,” it becomes clear that one of the
major considerations for judges interpreting the Reconstruction
Amendments was how far those amendments had expanded the class
of “created” or “conferred” rights by including provisions abolishing
slavery or involuntary servitude, or alluding to the “privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States,” to “due process of law,”
to “the equal protection of the laws,” and to “the right of citizens of
the United States to vote.” According to the Waite Court’s typology
of “civil rights,” if any of those provisions “created” or “conferred” a
new civil right, that right was national in character, and could be
enforced by the federal government against states.154
So if the “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States” were going to be treated as the federal equivalent of
Washington’s list of “privileges and immunities” enjoyed by state
citizens, then when a state “abridged” the making of contracts, or the
pursuit of an occupation, or access to the courts, or freedom from
physical attack or punishment, the federal government could enforce
those “privileges” or “immunities” against the state in question.
Similarly, if “due process of law” meant the opportunity to pursue
economic activity free from governmental restraints, or if “equal
protection of the laws” meant a new federal civil right not to be
treated unequally in the economic marketplace, those were “created”
civil rights, as capable as being enforced against willful or negligent
states as the right not to have one’s ability to vote restricted on the
basis of race.
That was why Miller resolved to make it clear that unless the
antebellum map of civil rights federalism were retained, momentous
consequences would follow. As he put it,
[T]he entire domain of the privileges and immunities of citizens
of the States [previously] lay within the constitutional and
legislative power of the States, and without that of the Federal
government. Was it the purpose of the fourteenth amendment,
by the simple declaration that no State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States, to transfer the security and
153. 6 F. Cas. at 552.
154. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
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protection of all . . . civil rights . . . from the States to the
Federal government? And where it is declared that Congress
shall have the power to enforce that article, was it intended to
bring within the power of Congress the entire domain of civil
rights heretofore belonging exclusively to the States?
. . . [S]uch a construction . . . would constitute this court a
perpetual censor upon all legislation of the States, on the civil
rights of their own citizens . . . . [T]he effect is to fetter and
degrade the State governments by subjecting them to the
control of Congress, in the exercise of powers heretofore
universally conceded to them . . . it radically changes the whole
theory of the relations of the State and Federal governments to
each other . . . .155

Thus, a minimalist interpretation of the “privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States” was necessary, Miller believed, to
prevent the derivation and enforcement of “civil rights” from
becoming the exclusive province of the federal courts and the federal
government. He also advanced a minimalist interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, dismissing the claim
that the Louisiana statute deprived the butchers of their property by
restraining their trade as supported by “no construction of that
provision that we have ever seen, or any that we deem
admissible . . . .”156
That left the Equal Protection Clause. If one recalls the allusions
to “state neglect” that surfaced in Waite Court decisions after the
Slaughter-House Cases, it is possible that Miller thought of the Equal
Protection Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as
giving the federal courts or Congress power to step in when states
declined to enforce the “secured” civil rights of their African
American citizens, such as by denying them the opportunity to hold
property or sue in court.
Two passages in Miller’s Slaughter-House opinion seem consistent
with that interpretation. In one, he noted that “[i]f . . . States did
not conform their laws to [the] requirements [of the Equal Protection
Clause], then by the fifth section of the article of amendment
Congress was authorized to enforce it by suitable legislation.”157 In the
other, speaking of the racial thrust of the Equal Protection Clause, he
said, “[W]e may safely leave that matter until . . . some case of State
oppression, by denial of equal justice in its courts, shall have claimed
a decision at our hands.”158 The passages suggest that in instances in
155. 83 U.S. at 77–78.
156. Id. at 81.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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which states declined to afford black citizens the same “natural” or
“secured” rights they afforded to white citizens, the Equal Protection
Clause could serve as a mandate for federal intervention.159
In short, the Slaughter-House Cases seem consistent with the
subsequent circuit court and Supreme Court decisions previously
discussed with regard to three issues: the uncertain, limited status of
federal “civil rights” after the Reconstruction Amendments; the
enduring power of the antebellum map of federal and state powers,
with its emphasis on the primacy of states in defining and limiting the
civil rights of their citizens; but at the same time a growing awareness
by Justices on the Waite Court that Southern states were
systematically denying African Americans opportunities to exercise
their secured rights, and a corresponding awareness that the federal
government could step in, under provisions of the Reconstruction
Amendments, to enforce those opportunities.160
2. The Civil Rights Cases

In the conventional historiography of Reconstruction, the Civil
Rights Cases are treated as perhaps the strongest evidence that the
Waite Court had abandoned black freedmen to the white
supremacists that had reemerged in Southern legislatures.161 The cases

159. That reading of the passages is consistent with Miller’s belief, expressed
in correspondence with his brother-in-law William Pitt Ballinger, a
resident of Texas, that Southern states were not enforcing laws
protecting the secured rights of their citizens when the parties seeking
protection under the laws were African American. “Show me a single
white man,” Miller wrote Ballinger, “that has been punished in a State
court for murdering a negro . . . . Show me that any public meeting has
been had to express indignation at such conduct. Show me that you or
any of the best men of the South have gone ten steps to prevent the
recurrence of such things.” Letter from Justice Samuel Miller to William
Pitt Ballinger (Feb. 6, 1867) (quoted in Ross, supra note 135, at 147).
160. There were vigorous dissents in the Slaughter-House Cases by Justices
Field, Bradley, and Swayne, with Chase concurring in Field’s dissent. 83
U.S. at 83–129. But the areas of disagreement between Miller and the
dissenting justices centered on their interpretations of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause and Due Process Clause, both of which, in the view
of the dissenters, provided support for protection of the right to pursue
a lawful calling (butchery) without interference by a state. None of the
dissenting opinions openly disagreed with Miller’s concern about the
federal government and the federal courts becoming “perpetual censors”
on the states, or all “civil rights” becoming national rights, nor did any
of them reject his claim that the federal government could intervene
under the Equal Protection Clause when states declined to afford black
citizens their “secured” civil rights. Id.
161. See, e.g., C. Peter Magrath, Morrison R. Waite: The Triumph
of Character 132–34 (1963); Equal Justice Under Law, supra
note 104, at 497–500.
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invalidated the Civil Rights Act of 1875.162 That legislation was
initially designed to prevent states, and in one instance private
enterprises, from discriminating on the basis of race in public schools;
the selection of juries; and public accommodations, which included
inns, forms of public transportation; and places of public amusement,
such as theaters and concerts.163 Although the public accommodations
provision extended to enterprises operated by private individuals,
such enterprises were taken to be open to members of the public
generally, so the line between state and private action did not seem
significant. By the time the Act was passed by a lame-duck session of
Congress in early 1875, the public schools provision had been
dropped.164 The other two provisions were immediately challenged on
constitutional grounds.
Securing broad protection against racial discrimination in public
accommodations had been part of the agenda of some Republicans in
Congress since the conclusion of the Civil War. Initially, legislation
providing such protection was thought to rest on the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but after the
Slaughter-House majority opinion’s limited reading of that clause,
such a rationale appeared problematic.165 Attention then turned to
two other sources of protection: the Thirteenth Amendment166 and the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.167 The first basis
had the advantage of being applicable to private individuals as well as
states, but it required that equal access to public accommodations for
blacks be thought of as a way of preventing the perpetuation of the
“badges and incidents of slavery.” The second basis was consistent
with a view of the Equal Protection Clause as directed at statesanctioned racial discrimination, but it required that private activity
in the public accommodations area be regarded as state activity.168
In the Civil Rights Cases, Bradley’s majority opinion would seize
upon both of those difficulties. But his opinion was very likely
affected by another concern about racial discrimination in public
accommodations. In the course of an 1876 correspondence with Justice
William Woods about whether the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was
constitutional, Bradley wrote a memorandum with some thoughts on
“Civil Rights.” They included the following:
162. 109 U.S. at 26.
163. See Rutherglen, supra note 29, at 88.
164. Id. at 89.
165. Id. at 90.
166. Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 728 (1872) (remarks of Senator
Sumner).
167. See Rutherglen, supra note 29, at 90.
168. Id. at 89.
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Surely Congress cannot guaranty to the colored people
admission to every place of gathering and amusement. To
deprive white people of the right of choosing their own company
would be to introduce another kind of slavery. . . . Surely a
white lady cannot be enforced by Congressional enactment to
admit colored persons to her ball or assembly or dinner party.
...
It never can be endured that the white shall be compelled to
lodge and eat and sit with the negro. . . . The antipathy of race
cannot be crushed and annihilated by legal enactment. . . .
The 13th Amendment declares that slavery and involuntary
servitude shall be abolished, and that Congress may enforce the
enfranchisement of the slaves. Granted: but does freedom of the
blacks require the slavery of the whites? [A]nd enforced
fellowship would be that.
The 14th amendment declares that no state shall make or
enforce any laws which shall abridge the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States. True. But is it a
privilege and immunity of a colored citizen to sit and ride by
the side of white persons?
It declares that no person shall be denied the equal
protection of the laws. But are they denied that protection
when they are required to eat and sit and ride by themselves,
and not with whites. . . . [S]urely it is no deprivation of civil
right to give each race the right to choose their own company.169

It is clear from these comments that Bradley believed that the right
to choose one’s own company was what had come to be called a
“social” right rather than a civil right. That distinction appeared in a
passage in his Civil Rights Cases opinion, in which, referring to the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, he said that “Congress did not assume . . .
to adjust . . . the social rights of men and races in the community;
but only to declare and vindicate those fundamental rights which
appertain to the essence of citizenship . . . .”170 That comment, and
169. The memorandum from the Joseph Bradley Papers is quoted in
Charles Fairman, Reconstruction and Renuion, 1864–1888: Part
Two 564 (1987).
170. 109 U.S. 1, 22 (1883). Rutherglen demonstrates that the distinction
between civil and social rights was present in the debates over both the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Civil Rights Act of 1875. See
Rutherglen, supra note 29, at 52, 89. Brandwein has argued that the
distinction was central in the latter set of debates and that it was
understood as having different federalism implications by Bradley and
Justice John Marshall Harlan in the Civil Rights Cases. See Brandwein,
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other passages in Bradley’s opinion, such as “[i]t would be running the
slavery argument into the ground to make it apply to every act of
discrimination which a person may see fit as to make as to the guests
he will entertain,”171 and “[w]hen a man has emerged from slavery,
and, by the aid of beneficent legislation, has shaken off the
inseparable concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in
the process of his elevation when he . . . ceases to be the special
favorite of the laws,”172 have contributed to the conventional view of
the decision as an effort on part of the Waite Court to facilitate a
retreat from the egalitarian ideals of Reconstruction.
But, as noted, the distinction between civil rights and social
rights had appeared in debates over the passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 and the Civil Rights Act of 1875: Bradley’s assumption
that an individual’s choice to discriminate with respect to the
entertainment of guests implicated “social” rather than “civil” rights
was neither novel nor exceptional.
Justice John Marshall Harlan, dissenting in the Civil Rights
Cases, acknowledged the existence of the civil rights and social rights
distinction. “I agree,” Harlan wrote, “that government has nothing to
do with social, as distinguished from technically legal, rights of
individuals. . . . I agree that if one citizen chooses not to hold social
intercourse with another, he is not and cannot be made amenable to
the law for his conduct in that regard; for even upon grounds of race,”
Harlan conceded, “no legal right of a citizen is violated by the refusal
of others to maintain social relations with him.”173 But the rights
being secured by the Civil Rights Act of 1875 were in Harlan’s view
“legal, not social rights.”174 He maintained that the right of black
citizens to have access to public accommodations on the same terms
as white citizens was “no more a social right than . . . [their] right to
sit in a public building with others, of whatever race, for the purpose
of hearing the public questions of the day discussed.”175
Bradley and Harlan’s contemporaries thus agreed that the
category of “civil rights”—protected legal rights of citizens—did not
include “social” rights. Their position on the protected status of a
right to equal access to public accommodations differed, however.
Bradley analogized equal access to public accommodations to equal
The Judicial Abandonment of Blacks?, supra note 9, at 352–57;
Brandwein, Rethinking Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 78–86,
163–64, 170–73.
171. 109 U.S. at 24.
172. Id. at 25.
173. Id. at 59.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 59–60.
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access to a dinner party or a ball. Enforced access for blacks would
submit whites to “another form of slavery”; each race had the right to
“choose its own company.”176 Harlan analogized the public
accommodations provisions of the 1875 Act to the right of a colored
citizen to use the accommodations of a public highway on the same
terms as are permitted to white citizens.177
But the social rights/civil rights distinction, or, for that matter,
Bradley’s observation that “[i]ndividual invasion of individual rights is
not the subject-matter of the [Fourteenth] amendment,”178 did not
figure prominently in his analysis of the constitutionality of the Civil
Rights Act of 1875. That Act was constitutionally defective, Bradley
concluded, because it exceeded the mandates of both the Fourteenth
and Thirteenth Amendments. The Fourteenth Amendment, he
maintained, was predicated on the principle that:
where a subject is not submitted to the general legislative power
of Congress, but is only submitted thereto for the purpose of
rendering effective some prohibition against particular State
legislation or State action in reference to that subject, the power
given is limited by its object, and any legislation by Congress in
the matter must necessarily be corrective in its character,
adapted to counteract and redress the operation of such
prohibited State laws or proceedings of State officers.179

The provision of the Fourteenth Amendment giving Congress the
power to enforce its other provisions “by appropriate legislation” thus
meant that the enforcement power would be limited by the scope of
those provisions.180 All the restrictive provisions of the Amendment—
its privileges or immunities, due process, and equal protection
clauses—were restrictions on states or their officials. The enforcement
provision of the Amendment could only come into play as a “mode[]
of redress against the operation of State laws, and the action of State
officers executive or judicial, when these are subversive of the
fundamental rights specified in the amendment.”181
Although Bradley clearly felt that access to public
accommodations was a social rather than a civil right, his opinion in
the Civil Rights Cases formally took no position on that issue. He
stated that although the Court had assumed “that a right to enjoy
equal accommodation and privileges in all inns, public conveyances,
176. Id. at 25.
177. Id. at 59.
178. Id. at 11.
179. Id. at 18.
180. Id. at 11.
181. Id.
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and places of public amusement, is one of the essential rights of the
citizen,” it was not necessary to resolve that issue because the Civil
Rights Act of 1875 far exceeded the enforcement power of the federal
government under the Fourteenth Amendment.182 It not only was
directed at individuals rather than states or state actors, it was
“primary and direct,” not “corrective” legislation. As Bradley put it,
The law in question, without any reference to adverse State
legislation on the subject, declares that all persons shall be
entitled to equal accommodations and privileges of inns, public
conveyances, and places of public amusement, and imposes a
penalty upon any individual who shall deny to any citizen such
accommodations and privileges. This is not corrective
legislation; it is primary and direct . . . . It supersedes and
displaces State legislation on the same subject . . . . It . . .
assumes that the matter is one that belongs to the domain of
national regulation.183

The theory of federalism animating Bradley’s analysis of the
Fourteenth Amendment in the Civil Rights Cases was thus similar to
that animating Miller’s Slaughter-House Cases opinion. In both the
Slaughter-House and Civil Rights Cases, Court majorities treated the
enforcement provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment as extending
only as far as the explicit coverage of that Amendment. Because the
prohibitions of the Privileges or Immunities, Due Process, and Equal
Protection Clauses were against “state” action, federal enforcement
could only take place against states or state officials. Otherwise the
federal government, and the federal courts, would be a “perpetual
censor” on the activities of the states;184 otherwise Congress could
“legislate on subjects which are within the domain of State
legislation”;185 otherwise Congress could “create a code of municipal
law for the regulation of private rights”;186 otherwise Congress could
“take the place of the State legislatures and . . . supersede them.”187
In short, allowing Congress to legislate generally on the rights of
life, liberty, and property because states were known to be capable of
depriving persons of those rights without due process of law assumed
that every time states were forbidden from legislating on a subject,
Congress had a general power to legislate on it. That assumption,

182. Id. at 19.
183. Id. at 18–19.
184. Id. at 12–15.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 11.
187. Id. at 13.
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Bradley declared in the Civil Rights Cases, was “certainly
unsound.”188
There was, however, the possibility that the Thirteenth
Amendment provided support for the Civil Rights Act of 1875. That
amendment did not merely prevent states from establishing or
maintaining slavery; it declared that slavery should not exist in the
United States and gave Congress power to enforce that declaration. If
one employed Bradley’s terminology in the Civil Rights Cases, the
amendment anticipated that federal legislation enforcing the abolition
of slavery could be “primary and direct in its character.”189 As
Bradley put it, Congress “has a right to enact all necessary and
proper laws for the obliteration and prevention of slavery with all its
badges and incidents . . . .”190
Thinking of the Slaughter-House Cases and the Civil Rights Cases
primarily as federalism cases, making use of language designed to
reveal when federal enforcement powers under the Civil Rights Act of
1866 and the Reconstruction Amendments could, or could not, be
invoked to correct state or private violations of civil rights, places the
previously quoted passages about “running the slavery argument into
the ground,” and African Americans being “the special favorite of the
laws” in a different light. They can be seen as rhetorical efforts to
counter the argument that denying black persons access to public
accommodations was a form of slavery, and thus correctable by the
federal government under the Thirteenth Amendment.191 Bradley
conceded that under the enforcement provision of the Thirteenth
Amendment, Congress could pass laws that were “direct and
primary,” and could “operat[e] upon the acts of individuals” as well as
those of states.192 So the question was whether “the refusal to any
persons of the accommodations of an inn or a public conveyance or a
place of public amusement by an individual” amounted to a “badge or
incident of slavery.” In Bradley’s view that question answered itself;
such an act of refusal had “nothing to do with slavery or involuntary
servitude.”193

188. Id. at 15.
189. Id. at 20.
190. Id. at 21.
191. Brandwein, Rethinking Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 173–78,
adds another issue to which Bradley’s rhetoric might have been directed:
the idea that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 might have been thought of
as “special legislation,” singling out African Americans for protection
against discrimination in public accommodations where Jews and Irish
were not comparably protected.
192. 109 U.S. at 23.
193. Id. at 24.
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Moreover, Bradley noted, “[t]here were thousands of free colored
people in this country before the abolition of slavery, . . . yet no one,
at that time, thought that it was any invasion of [their] personal
status as [freemen] because . . . [they were] subjected to
discriminations in the . . . amusement. Mere discriminations on
account of race and color were not regarded as badges of slavery.”194 It
may be the case that after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment
“the enjoyment of equal rights in all these respects [had] become
established.”195 But if that were so, it was necessary for a state to
deny such rights or neglect to enforce them before corrective federal
legislation could come into play.
E. Implications

To summarize, two issues figured prominently in the
constitutional history of civil rights after the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. The first issue was the content and the scope of
the category of “civil rights.” The other was the effect of the 1866 Act
and the Reconstruction Amendments on the antebellum relationship
between the federal government and the states. By the 1880s, a
consensus on those issues had been forged by the Supreme Court of
the United States. That consensus has not been described accurately
by conventional accounts of the constitutional history of the
Reconstruction years.
In recovering the context in which the category of civil rights
originated in American constitutional history, it is essential to
understand that the framers of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 were
simultaneously committed to ensuring that newly freed African
Americans were accorded the same civil rights as white persons and to
preserving the antebellum balance of state and federal powers. They
employed three devices in the Act to accomplish those goals: making
“all (non-alien) persons born in the United States” citizens of the
United States; affording all U.S. citizens an enumerated list of civil
rights; and stating that “all persons” were to have the same such
rights accorded white citizens.196 The rights listed, however, were ones
that had been traditionally reserved for citizens of states and were
thus held against state governments.
Understood in that fashion, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 created
no new civil rights for newly designated “citizens of the United
States” that had not already been held by citizens of states, with the
exception of free African Americans. By being citizens of the United
States, free African Americans had the same civil rights as
white citizens.
194. Id. at 25.
195. Id.
196. § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
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The enforcement sections of the Act demonstrated its ambiguous
relationship to antebellum models of federalism. Although the civil
rights listed in the Act were rights traditionally held against state
governments, Congress was given power to enforce the Act by
“appropriate” legislation, and the federal courts were given power to
uphold its provisions. The wording of Section 1 of the Act suggested
that its enforcement by agencies of the federal government would
likely take place when a state declined to afford free blacks the same
civil rights it afforded its white citizens.197 This raised the question of
whether the Act was designed to transform the balance between state
and federal powers; that question, we have seen, was debated in
Congress when it passed the Act.
Uncertainties about the effect of the goal of protecting the civil
rights of newly freed African Americans on the antebellum alignment
of state and federal powers also marked, we have seen, the debates
over the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. It was
clear that those Amendments were designed to protect the civil rights
of African Americans as well, but were they designed to protect other
newly created federal civil rights? That was the central issue for the
courts who began their interpretations of the Amendments in
the 1870s.
The work of the scholars previously cited, particularly that of
Brandwein on voting rights cases, has demonstrated that a judicial
consensus eventually emerged on how to resolve the above ambiguities
involving civil rights and federalism.198 The best way to see that
consensus in place is to read Bradley’s opinion in the Civil Rights
Cases against the backdrop of the cases, beginning with the SlaughterHouse Cases that have been previously discussed.
With respect to what was included and excluded in the category
of “civil rights,” one should first look to the terminology employed by
antebellum courts to characterize those rights, making use of
designations such as “natural,” “secured,” “guaranteed,” “created,”
and “conferred” rights. As courts began to work out the judicial
enforcement of rights after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
and the Reconstruction Amendments, it became clear that they were
treating different categories of rights as triggering different
institutional enforcement responses. Rights “created” by the
Reconstruction Amendments, such as the right not to have one’s
opportunity to vote restricted on the basis of race, could be enforced
by the federal government. In contrast, “secured” or “guaranteed”
rights, which had their origins in the “natural law” foundations of
common law, were rights held against states.199 Congress or federal
197. Id.
198. See supra Part III.C.
199. Brandwein, Rethinking Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 15.
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courts could only enforce those rights if states had willfully or
negligently failed to uphold them.
Thus the antebellum terminology of rights, as retained and
modified by post–Civil War enactments, served as the working
framework for both the inclusion and exclusion of those rights
associated with civil rights and the federalism issues. And Bradley’s
opinion in the Civil Rights Cases revealed that at the center of that
framework was an interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.200
Early in his opinion, Bradley had used the Civil Rights Act to
highlight his distinction between federal enforcement legislation that
was “corrective” in character and the “direct and primary” legislation
of the Civil Rights Act of 1875.201 After identifying the rights
enumerated in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Bradley noted that they
were rights “for which the States alone were or could be
responsible.”202 That is, the “secured” or “guaranteed” rights
identified as “civil rights” by the 1866 Act were rights held against
the states, and as such were to be enforced by state authorities.
Efforts on the part of individuals to infringe upon those rights did not
“destroy or injure” the rights because they could be “vindicated by
resort to the laws of the State for redress.”203 That was what Bradley
meant in saying that “civil rights, such as are guaranteed by the
Constitution against state aggression, cannot be impaired by the
wrongful acts of individuals, unsupported by State authority in the
shape of laws, customs, or judicial or executive proceedings.”204 He
noted that when the Civil Rights Act of 1866 enacted penalties
against individuals for violating the civil rights it enumerated, it had
included language making clear that individual violations needed to
be “under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation or
custom.”205
Bradley’s primary purpose in associating individual violations of
the rights enumerated in the 1866 Act with state law or custom was
to demonstrate that, unlike its 1875 counterpart, the 1866 Act was
limiting federal enforcement powers to those supporting “corrective”
legislation.206 But it is possible to understand his interpretation of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 in another way.
200. Brandwein, Judicial Abandonment of Blacks?, supra note 9, at 352–57,
and Brandwein, Rethinking Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 161–
67, recognize this point.
201. 109 U.S. at 20.
202. Id. at 18.
203. Id. at 17.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 16.
206. Id.
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Elsewhere in his opinion, Bradley had indicated that the
constitutional basis for the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was the
Fourteenth Amendment, whose Privileges or Immunities and Equal
Protection Clauses prohibited states from treating black and white
citizens differently in the exercise of their civil rights.207 The
constitutionality of the 1866 Act was thus taken for granted by
Bradley, but he understood Congress’s power to enforce the civil
rights it enumerated as being predicated on their being violated under
the authority of a state. Where individuals deprived black citizens of
the fundamental rights they now shared with white citizens and
states, under color or law or custom, failed to correct those
deprivations, Congress could use its enforcement powers.208
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 acted as both a floor and a ceiling
for the content and scope of “civil rights.” The only rights that states
were bound to enforce were those now associated, after the passage of
the Reconstruction Amendments, with state citizenship. And when
states failed to enforce those rights, corrective federal legislation could
ensue. It was not necessary that state officials or policies are the
source of deprivations of the civil rights of blacks; state officials or
policies could also fail to punish individual violations of civil rights of
blacks and trigger enforcement. But “civil rights” meant only the
“fundamental rights” identified by Bradley as listed in the Civil
Rights Act of 1866.
We are now in a position to understand more clearly what
Bradley meant in saying that “civil rights, such as are guaranteed by
the Constitution against State aggression, cannot be impaired by the
wrongful acts of individuals . . . .”209 He meant that only when state
authorities failed to vindicate such rights from infringement, or to
punish those who infringed them, would the enforcement provisions of
the 1866 Act or the Fourteenth Amendment come into play. We are
also in a position to understand more clearly what he meant when, in
the course of discussing the Thirteenth Amendment as one of the
bases for the 1866 Act, he said that “Congress did not assume, under
the authority given by the Thirteenth Amendment, to adjust what
may be called the social rights of men and races in the community,
but only to declare those fundamental rights which appertain to the
essence of citizenship . . . .”210 He looked to the Civil Rights Act of
1866 as an authoritative source of fundamental rights, but also as an
indication of what rights were not “fundamental.”
207. Id. at 21–25.
208. Brandwein, Judicial Abandonment of Blacks?, supra note 9, at 352–57,
and Brandwein, Rethinking Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 162–
65, read Bradley’s opinion in the same fashion.
209. 109 U.S. at 17.
210. Id. at 22.

811

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 3·2014
The Origins of Civil Rights in America

This prepared Bradley for his conclusion in the Civil Rights Cases
that access to inns, public conveyances, and places of public
amusement was a “social” rather than a civil right. In his view, the
framers of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 could not have regarded equal
access to public accommodations as a “fundamental right” of
citizenship.211 That Act was the ceiling as well as the floor of
Reconstruction-era civil rights.212

Conclusion: A Revised Narrative of the
Origins of Civil Rights
Bradley’s opinion in the Civil Rights Cases represents a snapshot
of the legal status of civil rights in America approximately twenty
years after the end of the Civil War.213 It also represents a snapshot of
the predominant view of the relationship of the federal government
and the states in the area of civil rights. Here, again, the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 served as a template.
I began this analysis by suggesting that recent scholarship has
shown that the conventional history of the Supreme Court’s role in
interpreting the Reconstruction Amendments in civil rights cases
needs refinement. Drawing on that scholarship, I am claiming that the
two most “notorious” decisions featured in that conventional history,
the Slaughter-House and Civil Rights Cases, need to be read in
connection with other civil rights decisions of the Court and its
Justices between 1871 and 1883. From those decisions, the following

211. Id.
212. It is worth noting here how this understanding of equal access to public
accommodations as a “social right” rather than a fundamental civil
right, and of the practice of denying free persons of color equal access to
public accommodations in the antebellum period, might have served to
validate the practice of racial segregation on railroad cars that the
Court upheld in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). One might
recall Bradley’s 1876 memorandum, in which, after reciting the Privilege
or Immunities and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment, asked, “[I]s it a privilege and immunity of a colored citizen
to ride and sit by the side of white persons?” and “[A]re [blacks] denied
[the equal protection of the laws] when they are required to ride and sit
and eat by themselves, and not with whites?” See supra note 169 and
accompanying text. Elsewhere in the memorandum, Bradley had said
that “it never can be endured that the white shall be compelled to eat
and lodge and sit with the negro . . . . The antipathy of race cannot be
crushed and annihilated by legal enactment.” Id. Brandwein, however,
takes the view that the doctrinal connections between the Civil Rights
Cases and Plessy were tenuous, and required some additional steps on
the part of the Court. See Brandwein, Rethinking Reconstruction,
supra note 9, 187–88.
213. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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jurisprudential consensus affecting the role of the states and the
federal government in “civil rights” cases can be extracted.
Most civil rights were creatures of state law. Whether the sources
of those rights were natural law, antebellum common law, the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, or judicial efforts to identify “fundamental rights”
associated with citizenship, the consensus was that articulated by
Bradley in the Civil Rights Cases: the civil rights of individuals were,
on the whole, to be enforced by state courts, unless it could be shown
that states had willfully or negligently failed to protect those rights.
There was, however, a category of civil rights that had been “created”
or “conferred” by provisions of the Constitution, such as the Fifteenth
Amendment right not to have one’s opportunity to vote restricted on
the basis of race or color. Created rights, like the right not to have
one’s ability to vote restricted on racial lines, could be enforced by
Congress and the federal courts, and did not require state action.
The majority in the Civil Rights Cases rebuffed Harlan’s view
that equal access to public accommodations was a civil right rather
than a social right.214 But that did not mean that the majority took
those “fundamental” civil rights enjoyed by black as well as white
citizens to be wholly at the sufferance of states and state officials. The
disinclination of the Court in the Civil Rights Cases to compel equal
access to public accommodations left the rest of its post–Civil War
jurisprudence intact, which meant that whenever one of the
“fundamental” civil rights accorded to citizens was not enforced,
whether willfully, carelessly, or inadvertently by a state court,
“corrective” federal legislation under the Thirteenth or Fourteenth
Amendment could enforce the right, and whenever an individual or a
state interfered with the exercise of voting on the basis of race or
color, “direct and primary” federal legislation could ensue.215
The Court’s post–Civil War jurisprudence of civil rights was thus
designed to preserve, in large measure, the antebellum balance of
federal and state powers so as to prevent the federal government from
becoming a “perpetual censor” of the activities of states. At the same
time, the Court’s jurisprudence was designed to create a space for
“primary and corrective” federal legislation to guarantee the
enforcement of two sorts of civil rights violations: the willful or
negligent failure of states to enforce the “secured” civil rights
enumerated in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the failure of state or
private actors to guarantee civil rights “created” or “conferred” by the
Constitution. Because the latter category of civil rights was
comparatively small, and because some “under color of state law”
requirement was necessary to trigger federal enforcement of the
former category, the Court’s Justices believed that an appropriate
214. Id. at 59.
215. See supra Part III.C.2.
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balance between state and federal powers would remain after the
Reconstruction enactments.
Two decades after the conclusion of the Civil War, the state of
civil rights in America was in a distinctive place. In one respect, the
concept of “civil rights” had evolved dramatically from its virtually
nonexistent status in antebellum jurisprudence. “Rights” had been
associated with state citizenship, which had been extended to
virtually all native-born residents of a state and had been equated
with national citizenship. 216 A list of civil rights had been enumerated
in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and been characterized as
“fundamental” in Supreme Court decisions.217 Those rights had
explicitly been afforded to black as well as white persons. In contrast
to the antebellum jurisprudence of rights, in which states could define
citizenship in a fashion that excluded numerous categories of persons
from that status and could limit the rights of non-citizens with
impunity, this was a substantial change. Not only had “civil rights”
become an established and meaningful legal category, but also nearly
all Americans were regarded as possessing civil rights.
In another respect, the jurisprudential status of civil rights in the
1880s reflected the origins of that category in the antebellum legacies
of slavery, racial discrimination, and the autonomy of the states.218
Although the language of some provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment had been expansive, speaking of “privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States,” “due process of law,” and
the “equal protection of the laws,” court decisions had interpreted the
Amendment’s primary purpose as elevating blacks out of slavery by
preventing states from subjecting them to discriminatory treatment.
The Privileges or Immunities Clause was read narrowly, the Due
Process Clause was deemed not to cover economic “liberties,” and the
Equal Protection Clause was read as a corrective standard for the acts
of state and state officials, not as the source of a new national right to
be free from discrimination of a variety of sources.
Each time a Reconstruction-era Congressional statute or
constitutional amendment raised the possibility of the federal
government’s exercising vigorous oversight of discriminatory state
customs or laws, courts rejected the notion. The enforcement
provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was treated as applicable
only to racially discriminatory actions engaged in, or tolerated by,
216. “Indians not taxed,” which included most members of Native American
tribes living on reservations, were not regarded as citizens of the United
States until 1924 and were not allowed to vote in several states as late
as the 1970s. See Frank Pommersheim, Broken Landscape:
Indians, Indian Tribes, and the Constitution 164–81 (2009).
217. 109 U.S. at 22.
218. See supra Part I.
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state officials. The Fourteenth Amendment’s provisions were treated
in a comparable fashion. Only the Fifteenth Amendment’s
enforcement provision pertaining to voting rights was made applicable
to individuals as well as state actors. “Direct and primary” legislation
allowing the federal government to enforce civil rights without a
predicate of state neglect, such as that anticipated in the Civil Rights
Act of 1875, was invalidated.
Perhaps most ominously, the category of “fundamental” civil
rights only expanded in one respect after the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. Voting rights, conceived of as rights not to have
voting opportunities restricted on the basis of race or color, were
thought of as “fundamental” rights, and because they had been
conferred, they could be enforced without a state action predicate.219
Otherwise, the list of “fundamental” rights associated with citizenship
looked about the same in 1883 as it had when Washington sought to
enumerate “privileges and immunities” in 1823.220 Moreover, the
category of “social rights” had emerged as an implicit limitation on
the category of civil rights. To say that someone had a “social right”
to do something was the equivalent of saying that the action had no
legal protection.
The “social rights” category threatened to become more robust as
the focus of racial discrimination moved, in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, from explicit efforts on the part of states to
afford blacks fewer opportunities than whites to efforts on the part of
states and private individuals to prevent blacks and whites from
contact in public places. As inns, public conveyances, other public
facilities such as schools, hospitals, and “places of public amusement”
recognized that they could not entirely bar groups of persons from
access, they, along with state legislatures, began to segregate their
black and white patrons.
Racial segregation can be thought of as a response to several of
the concerns Bradley raised in his 1876 memorandum on civil rights.221
It reinforced the idea that in social settings people could choose with
whom they associated, exercising what amounted to a “natural” right
of association, which Bradley felt could not be overcome by law. It
also reinforced what Bradley called “racial antipathy”—the belief that
most whites would not want blacks to “eat, sit, or lodge” with them.
Finally, it introduced the rationale of “separate but equal.” As

219. See § 1, 14 Stat. 27; 109 U.S. at 17–18.
220. Compare Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) with Corfield v. Coryell,
6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
221. The memorandum from the Joseph Bradley Papers is quoted in
Charles Fairman, Reconstruction and Reunion, 1864–1888:
Part Two 564 (1987).
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Bradley noted, if blacks were required to eat or sit or ride with other
blacks, that was just a choice to be in the society of their own kind.222
But it is a mistake to allow the expansion of the social rights
category in segregation statutes and court decisions from the 1890s
through the 1920s to overwhelm the civil rights jurisprudence of the
1870s and 1880s. Those decades are best seen not as preparation for
the world of Jim Crow, but as a period in which antebellum
conceptions of rights and federalism awkwardly coexisted with
impulses to define and to protect the legal rights of African
Americans emerging from slavery into an uncertain future.
In retrospect, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, not the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, or Fifteenth Amendments, was the talismanic postReconstruction civil rights document. It was in some respects a replay
of lingering antebellum issues. Its focus was primarily on buttressing
the rights of former slaves by protecting them from further
discrimination. Its list of protected “fundamental” rights was drawn
from antebellum jurisprudence. Courts interpreted its potential to
transform state law through its enforcement provisions as minimal,
and thus its enactment had little effect on the antebellum map of
federal and state relations. But at the same time, it did something
monumental.
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 transformed the indeterminate
antebellum status of “rights” in America into a legal category whose
application was as broad as the new legal category of citizen, which
after the Fourteenth Amendment applied to the vast majority of
persons residing in the United States. No longer could states limit the
rights of their residents simply by declining to treat them as citizens.
Moreover, persons of “every race and color,” as citizens, were entitled
to the same rights as white citizens: no longer could states make race
a proxy for granting or denying civil rights. It seems fair to say that
with the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 came the origins
of civil rights in America.

222. Id.
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